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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 coherent EU policy is needed for corporate tax reform, going beyond the 1997
tax package. A clear direction should be set by European policy-makers towards
EU-wide taxation of groups of companies and a common tax base. This will
require agreement on a formula to apportion taxable income across the EU’s member
states.
The bundling of three different tax issues at the EU level — the code of conduct,
savings taxation and fiscal state aid — has brought major breakthroughs in the direct
taxation debate. The limitations and ambiguities of this strategy, however, are becoming
apparent and a new direction is needed. Questions remain regarding the reach of the
Primarolo Report and the 66 harmful tax measures in the EU, which the EU Council has
not yet discussed and endorsed. The Commission is exploiting its powers in the area of
state aids to put pressure on member states. And the European Court of Justice has
targeted distorting domestic tax laws. As a result, reforms undertaken at the national
level in response to these actions tend to be uncoordinated and to lack direction.
The policy choices
The question then becomes what direction is most appropriate for EU corporate tax
policy? In this report we suggest that a fundamental goal of EU corporate tax policy
should be to balance positive integration (that is, market-shaping tax policies) and
negative integration (that is, market-creating tax policies). To understand why this
balance is important, one should observe that there are two types of distortions in the
single market: for simplicity, we call them tax holes and tax obstacles.
The fight against harmful tax competition aims to tackle the issue of tax holes by using
positive integration. The idea behind the current tax package is based on positive or
market-shaping policies, that is, policies aimed at governing or directing the market.
The official rhetoric in the EU fight against harmful tax competition stresses the need to
curb unbridled harmful tax competition – a clear indication of the intention to steer a
process. Market-shaping policies (or positive integration), however, make sense only if
a single market exists for tax purposes. Conceptually, positive integration is a step that
should follow negative integration. One should first strike down the obstacles to the
single market; then one should try to shape or govern the undesirable aspects of the
market.
The negative integration component of tax policy, however, is still embryonic at best.
The 1990 directives (on parent-subsidiaries and mergers and acquisitions), the action of
the European Court of Justice, and the proposal for a directive on interest and royalty
payments do not represent an adequate framework for an effective action against tax
obstacles. To achieve a balance in EU tax policy, dealing with tax obstacles should
become at least as important as dealing with tax holes.
This means addressing the following problems companies face in doing business in the
Community:
•  the maze of different rules for the calculation of profits;
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•  the need to justify prices between related and increasingly integrated enterprises as
arm's-length prices when no comparables may be available;
•  the presence of fifteen different tax authorities, which implies different
administrative styles and requirements, and different approaches to cross-border tax
disputes; and
•  the differences in the tax base.
It should be possible to achieve a proper balance between positive and negative
integration now that the relationships between institutions and the business community
are changing. Both the OECD and the EU are more actively engaged in dialogue with
business than in the past. Several joint initiatives, policy fora and studies are underway.
The two panels established by the Commission on effective tax rates and the tax
obstacles to the single market are the most important acknowledgement that a more
balanced approach is needed. The recent policy on tax infringements – inaugurated with
the Communication on the elimination of tax obstacles to the cross-border provision of
occupational pensions – aims to create the tax conditions conducive to the single
market, thus pursuing a negative integration approach.
In terms of policy instruments, the Commission is seeking to enrich the menu of
instruments used to advance tax policy. In the future, the Commission is unlikely to
propose the use of directives in addressing direct tax issues and may seek to use more
flexible instruments. The use of an open coordination method need not be restricted to
the code of conduct. Indeed, it could be one of the options to consider in the reform of
EU corporate taxation. The Commission may also use enhanced cooperation when a
critical mass of countries (but not all of them) wish to take a common position on
taxation. It is unlikely that enhanced cooperation will be used in areas such as the
taxation of savings, but there is scope for enhanced cooperation in policies aimed at
attacking the tax obstacles to the creation of the single market.
The political climate and the new directions in terms of policy instruments create an
opportunity for a coherent corporate tax policy for the single market. The questions are
what is the final objective, what needs to be done, and how can the EU do it?
Options for a future EU tax system
One thing is clear: unless member states dispense with taxing corporate profits, there
can be no final solution to the tax issues of companies doing business in the single
market without the adoption of EU-wide group taxation and a common tax base. This is
the only satisfactory long-term solution and should be the direction of EU corporate tax
policy. It requires a definition of the EU group, a single computation of EU profit for
the group and a uniform formula to apportion that profit among the member states. As
this report indicates, monetary union, the creation of the single market and greater
cross-border activity of EU companies increase the urgency for member states to make
progress towards a common European corporate tax base.
But while that much is agreed, the question is how can member states move from fifteen
different corporate tax systems to a common corporate tax base in every member state?
The CEPS Task Force has considered two particular ideas for progress to that objective
– Home State Taxation (HST) and optional Common Base Taxation (optional CBT):CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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•  HST allows European enterprises (companies, branches and groups) to be taxed
solely by reference to the tax rules of their elected ‘home state’. Each member state
in which the enterprise operates shares in the profits calculated under home state
rules and allocated under an agreed formula.
•  With optional CBT, member states agree common rules for computing corporate
profits (i.e. a common tax base) but allow companies the option either to use the
domestic tax base of each member state in which they operate or to adopt the
common EU tax base for the totality of their EU operations.
Both proposals allow companies to compute their EU profits under a single set of rules
(rather than under 15 different rules) and to apportion those profits across the EU to be
taxed in the individual member states. Thus, both HST and optional CBT require
agreement by member states on some uniform formula to apportion profits.
Three main issues must be resolved in any formulary system before the EU could
consider replacing the current arm’s length system with HST or optional CBT. These
issues are:
1)  the definition of an EU-wide group;
2)  the composition of the formula and the definition of the factors used in the formula
to apportion income; and
3)  the creation of greater cross-border administrative cooperation and capabilities.
The report examines the experience in countries that have formula systems in place to
gain insight into the issues that arise in defining an EU-wide group and devising a
satisfactory apportionment formula.
If these issues are common both to the final solution of a common EU corporate tax
base and to the proposed paths to that solution – HST and optional CBT – how do HST
and optional CBT differ and which is to be preferred?
At a technical level, optional CBT appears the better proposal. While it leaves in place
fifteen different domestic tax systems that companies may choose if that suits them
better, optional CBT produces a single tax base that companies operating throughout the
EU may prefer to use for the advantages that it offers in terms of simplicity, compliance
costs and administration.
Nevertheless, it does require member states to define a common EU-level tax base at the
outset. In doing so, it appears to face the same problems that previous attempts to define
a common base have faced: namely, that member states are unable to agree on how the
common tax base should be defined. Thus, at first glance, optional CBT does not appear
to improve on previous efforts at EU company tax reform.
Proponents of optional CBT, however, point out that a CBT  parallel to (rather than
replacing) present domestic systems may assist governments to agree and implement a
common tax base for companies operating in different member states. The most
important aspect of this parallel approach is that governments are not required to change
their domestic tax legislation (other than to allow companies with branches and
subsidiaries in different member states the option of adopting the common tax base).
Moreover, governments will preserve tax sovereignty over their domestic tax bases andEXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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tax rates and purely domestic companies will continue to be taxed under the domestic
system.
Accordingly, member states should be more inclined to agree a common tax base than if
they were seeking to define a common tax base to replace their domestic tax systems. In
doing so, they will also have the support of European business, which wishes member
states to address the tax issues of the single market but which fears that a common tax
base replacing domestic tax systems may impose higher tax burdens on business and
may be uncompetitive.
By comparison, Home State Taxation does not require member states to agree on a
common tax base at the outset. As there is no generally accepted view of how the tax
base for companies should be defined, member states would mutually agree to respect
the methods adopted by other member states for computing EU income (provided those
methods fell within broadly agreed parameters of an acceptable corporate tax base).
As such, HST leaves in place fifteen different corporate tax systems but in effect allows
companies by choosing their home state to select one of those tax systems as the
common tax base that it will adopt throughout the EU. As such, HST does not require
tax policy-makers to agree ex ante what is the ‘optimal tax base’ for the EU, when
agreement may not be driven solely by economic analysis and optimal criteria. Instead,
the flexible market-driven process of mutual recognition that HST involves will over
time select the tax base that suits the single market best.
Neither HST nor optional CBT is an ideal or final solution. Optional CBT, by creating a
common tax base but allowing the co-existence of fifteen alternative domestic bases,
and HST with the choice it offers of fifteen alternative common tax bases, present a
number of technical and administrative issues for European businesses and member
states. Nevertheless, the aim of each proposal is to encourage convergence in the fifteen
existing corporate tax systems, through facilitating agreement in the case of optional
CBT and through market-driven convergence in the case of HST.
Ultimately, therefore, each proposal is justified in terms of the need to find practical
ways of moving towards the ideal single market solution for taxing corporate profits,
namely a single corporate tax base adopted on an EU-wide basis. In this respect, any
final assessment of the potential of HST and of optional CBT as steps to that end should
involve an assessment of whether HST would produce convergence or growing
diversity of tax bases, and whether an Optional CBT would preserve the integrity of the
initial agreement on the common base or would involve continuing competition
between (and, as a result, erosion of) both the common and domestic tax bases.
Although many players in the EU are eager to solve the tax problems faced by
enterprises with EU-wide operations, the underlying economic conditions as well as the
political conditions may not yet exist for the immediate adoption of radical approaches
such as HST or optional CBT. Nevertheless, the experience in countries that do not have
internal tax and other barriers to cross-border activity very strongly suggests that the
adoption of a single corporate tax base and an apportionment tax system will be the
appropriate outcome in the long run if the EU is to continue to tax corporate profits.1
INTRODUCTION
MALCOLM GAMMIE, CHAIRMAN OF THE CEPS TASK FORCE
Ideal options for corporate taxation in Europe
Tax policy within a single country rarely develops in a rational fashion. We should not
expect, therefore, that the coordination of tax policies of fifteen countries should
proceed in a rational fashion. In the corporate tax field, however, the final objective of
any such coordination where the fifteen countries are seeking to create a single market
is clear:
1.  Either those countries should abolish the corporate income tax and move to taxing
corporate cash flow,
1 or
2.  they should impose at a European level a corporate income tax (EUCIT) at a
uniform rate on corporate profits that are measured according to a common set of
rules, where the resulting tax revenues either are treated as Community resources or
are divided amongst member states on an agreed basis.
2
No government of the existing member states
3 has explicitly adopted the first option as
its policy, although this option may in fact be the outcome of the current failure of
member states to coordinate their corporate tax policies. And as regards EUCIT, the
current political institutions of the Community have not developed to a stage that could
support this solution.
4 This, certainly, is the view the task force has adopted in its
discussions of EUCIT.
A common corporate tax base for Europe
The principal alternative to EUCIT would be for member states to adopt a common
corporate tax base. This would involve agreement on three principal elements:
•  A common method of measuring corporate profits;
                                                
1 This is the solution proposed by Niklas Virin, which is set out in the Appendix to this report. It is also
what I suggested as the most efficient outcome in my final lecture in 1998 as Unilever Professor of
International Business Law (see Gammie, 1998, in particular pp.166-167).
2 In the UK single market comprising England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, there is one
corporation tax, the revenues of which form part of central government resources but which could equally
well be shared on an agreed basis between the four countries. If the UK wishes to tax corporate income,
one tax is likely to produce a more efficient outcome than four country corporation taxes, even if
coordinated. This is so both for businesses and for governments: businesses face less distortion than in the
case of four country taxes; and in the case of governments, competition for the tax base between four
countries may result in the four countries in aggregate raising less revenue than does one tax.
3 Although option 1 is the direction that has been pursued by Estonia, which is an applicant for
membership of the EU.
4 Some European politicians, for example the Finance Ministers of Germany and Belgium, have
suggested that there should be a European level tax (although not necessarily a corporate profits tax) to
supplement the Community Budget and have noted that European businesses is likely to press for tax
harmonisation in an increasingly integrated market (see Financial Times, 15 June 2001). Other ministers,
for example those in the UK, note the different levels of taxation and public expenditure in Member
States and the continuing diversity in tax systems and the relative importance of different taxes to
Member States, based on the cultural, social and historical development of their tax systems.INTRODUCTION BY MALCOLM GAMMIE
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•  Which business entity (company/group) is to be used for the purposes of that
measurement, and
•  a uniform formula for splitting corporate profits between the member states.
5
The Task Force is agreed that if:
a)  member states wish to achieve a single market, and
b)  within that single market, they wish to tax corporate profits,
then they should aim to adopt a common corporate tax base with these features.
This would resolve many of the tax issues of 15 different corporate tax systems that
European business increasingly draws to the attention of governments. Agreement on a
common tax basis would also to a significant extent eliminate competition (harmful or
otherwise) between member states for the tax base, competition that may otherwise
reduce the overall tax collected on corporate profits within Europe below its ‘optimal’
level.
6
Problems for achieving a common corporate tax base
If that is so clearly the most efficient outcome, why is it so difficult for member states to
recognise that and to agree a common tax base?
In answering this, we can compare corporate income tax with value-added tax.
Agreement on VAT has been driven by the requirement of Article 93 of the EC Treaty
that:
the EC Council shall…adopt provisions for the harmonisation of legislation concerning
turnover taxes…to the extent that it is necessary to ensure the establishment and the
functioning of the internal market.
There is no equivalent Treaty requirement for corporate income tax.
7 Article 93 is not,
however, the sole reason why member states have been able to agree and adopt a VAT.
The truth of this is apparent when you consider that (without the imperative of Article
93) every major economy (other than the United States) has adopted a VAT that
exhibits similar features to the European model.
The essential reason why it has been possible for member states to implement Article 93
and to agree directives stated in relatively general terms, is because the tax base for
VAT is objectively verifiable, comprising principally easily observed and verified cash
transactions. The difficulties of the VAT base are found in areas that do not involve
                                                
5 If member states could agree on a common tax rate to apply to corporate profits, it would be possible to
agree a formula to split the tax rather than a formula to split profits, where the profits after apportionment
are taxed at each member state’s tax rate.
6 I.e. below the level that would be collected under EUCIT, although those who regard the optimal
outcome as being the abolition of taxes on corporate profits would not regard the collection of any such
tax as ‘optimal’.
7 With the exception of Article 94, which reads ‘The Council shall…issue directives for the
approximation of such laws, regulations or administrative provisions of the Member States as directly
affect the establishment or functioning of the common market.’ This has been the basis of the two
existing corporate tax directives, on parent-subsidiary dividends and on cross-border mergers, and is the
basis for the proposed directive on parent-subsidiary interest and royalties.CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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cash transactions,
8 or where the activity is cash-based, so that it is difficult to
disentangle the ‘value-added’ element of any cash transaction.
9 Thus, even with VAT,
not every aspect of the system is as yet common to every member state.
10
By comparison, the corporate tax base is not objectively verifiable. The measurement of
corporate profits depends only peripherally on cash transactions. More importantly, it
depends in practical terms upon the subjective judgements of accountants in arriving at
commercial accounting profits and on the different adjustments that countries make to
profits as so ascertained. Thus, the outcome within the EU is not one measure of
corporate profits, but fifteen.
This difference between the VAT base and the corporate income base means that it is
unlikely that the principle of a common corporate tax base could be captured with the
same clarity as the principle of the common VAT base, as expressed in Article 2 of the
First VAT Directive of 1967.
11 To say that the corporate income tax is a tax on
corporate profits merely poses the question of how you should measure profits for tax
purposes. And a further reference to corporate profits, as measured, for example, by
adjusted international accounting standards, asks:
a)  how far international accounting standards are compatible with a tax base,
b)  what adjustments are in mind, and
c)  what is the extent of the regulations and directives that will be needed to specify
those things?
If, despite the clarity of the VAT principle, there remain differences in the VAT bases
of member states, we might wonder in what ways a common corporate tax base might
still diverge between member states in the absence of a similarly clear principle for that
base.
That does not mean that member states should not seek to agree a common corporate
tax base or that it would be impossible for them to reach agreement on a common base.
Nor does it mean that the remaining differences between member states in the practical
definition of taxable profits are or would be large. Nevertheless, the division of taxable
profits amongst the member states under a uniform formula requires the same definition
of  taxable  profit in all member states.
12 The division of  consolidated commercial
accounting profits amongst member states under a uniform formula, with each member
                                                
8 E.g. land transactions; discounts and voucher transactions, etc.
9 E.g. financial and insurance services. These aspects in particular lead to cases of partial exemption and
the resulting difficulty in attributing input tax to taxable supplies.
10 There may also be issues in how to administer the tax base, even if it can be objectively verified.
11 Article 2 of the First VAT Directive describes the common VAT base in these terms:
The principle of the common system of VAT involves the application to goods and services
of a general tax on consumption exactly proportional to the price of the goods and services,
whatever the number of transactions which take place in the production and distribution
process before the stage at which tax is charged.
On each transaction, VAT, calculated on the price of the goods or services at the rate
applicable to such goods or services, shall be chargeable after deduction of the amount of
VAT borne directly by the various cost components.
12 As well as an identical definition of the taxable entity or group whose taxable profits are being divided.INTRODUCTION BY MALCOLM GAMMIE
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state making its own tax adjustments to its share of commercial accounting profits, does
not produce a common corporate tax base for Europe, although it might represent a
positive step towards a common tax base and an improvement in the current situation.
13
In contrast to the European scenario, finding the right measure of taxable corporate
profits is more straightforward in both the US and Canada. There, the federal corporate
income tax offers a single definition of corporate profits as a starting point from which
states and provinces can work, if they choose.
Options for progress on corporate taxation in Europe
Faced with these issues, the CEPS Task Force considered two main ideas for making
progress towards a common corporate tax base within Europe. The first is the Home
State Taxation (HST) idea
14 and the second is an optional system of common base
taxation (Optional CBT).
15 Alexander Klemm looks at these ideas in Part II of this
report.
16
Home State Taxation (HST)
The tax base under HST is relatively clear: it is the taxable profits of the entity as
determined under the rules of the entity’s home state. Thus, an entity uses one measure
of taxable profits only, even though every entity can in theory
17 at the outset select
between 15 different methods of measuring taxable profits. Although each measure
would differ in its detail (at the outset at least), HST envisages that the different
measures would produce substantially similar measures of taxable profits over time.
This is because each member state’s system would conform to agreed parameters –
effectively a common corporate tax model – and member states would not be free to
change their system unilaterally so as no longer to conform to that model.
Optional common base taxation (Optional CBT)
The proponents of Optional CBT do not define a common tax base but suggest that the
tax base could be derived from international accounting standards, a synthesis of
                                                
13 This would presumably require member states to accept the consolidated reporting group as the taxable
entity. I assume that it would nevertheless be possible to make tax adjustments by reference to individual
companies that are part of that consolidated reporting group.
14 Originating from the Chairman’s research at Leiden University and taken forward by the Stockholm
Group; see Lodin and Gammie (2001).
15 Proposed in particular by Assonime, an organisation of Italian business, and amongst the proposals
considered by UNICE, the federation of European business organisations.
16 Different people make different assessments as to whether it would be easier for member states to agree
HST or Optional CBT and whether it would be possible to implement HST or Optional CBT in some
member states if all are unable to agree. In assessing the relative economic merits of the two proposals in
Part II, however, Mr. Klemm has adopted a common basis for each proposal: i.e. that if member states
can agree to adopt HST then they should also be able to agree the detail of Optional CBT. Thus, for the
purposes of his economic assessment, he compares HST in all member states with Optional CBT in all
member states.
17 The option of all 15 would depend upon what freedom the system allows an enterprise in its choice of
Home State.CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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taxation rules of the member state, or a combination of both approaches.
18 Accordingly,
the issues to be agreed in arriving at an Optional CBT seem no different from those for
a non-optional or mandatory common base.
19 Under Optional CBT, however, corporate
entities within Europe would be allowed the choice between the common tax base and
the corporate tax base (if different) defined in each member state.
20
Proponents of Optional CBT point out that a common tax base parallel to (rather than
replacing) present domestic systems may assist governments to agree and implement a
common tax base for companies operating in different member states. The most
important aspect of this parallel approach is that governments are not required to change
their domestic tax legislation (other than to allow companies with branches and
subsidiaries in different member states the option of adopting the common tax base).
Moreover, governments will preserve tax sovereignty over their domestic tax bases and
tax rates and purely domestic companies will continue to be taxed under the domestic
system.
Accordingly, member states should be more inclined to agree a common tax base than if
they were seeking to define a common tax base to replace their domestic tax systems. In
doing so, they will also have the support of European business, which wishes member
states to address the tax issues of the single market but which fears that a common tax
base replacing domestic tax systems may impose higher tax burdens on business and
may be uncompetitive.
Formulary apportionment in Europe
Alex Klemm in Part II notes that there is no correct way (or formula) for dividing profit.
This is true whether member states adopt the common measure of profit under Optional
CBT or the home state measure of profit. Similarly, there is no correct way to define the
unitary entity (company or group) whose profit is measured and divided. In this case,
Optional CBT requires agreement on a definition of the European entity to which the
common base would apply, while HST offers the possibility of extending the definition
used under each member state’s domestic legislation subject to agreement on some
common principles.
If we assume that member states can agree a formula, as they must under either
Optional CBT or HST, that formula – whatever its detail – would be a uniform one for
Europe and could not be changed unilaterally by any member state.
21 Thus, under either
                                                
18 A necessary precursor to member state agreement on these would presumably be through the use of an
expert committee to examine the technical issues, as proposed in 1992 by the Ruding Committee.
19 For an indication of the technical issues, see the Ruding Committee Report in European Commission
(1992), Chapter 10 and Annex 3A.
20 This indicates (although it is not explicitly stated in the proposal) that under Optional CBT it is taxable
profits that are apportioned to member states and not just the commercial accounting profits that then
form the basis for adjustment under each member state’s domestic rules. I assume that companies would
be unable to opt in and out of the system over time.
21 To the extent that elements of any formula depended upon the valuation of particular factors, different
valuation methods (or what different revenue authorities were prepared to accept as valuations) might
lead to some small divergence in the application of the formula between countries. Such differences
would be of a different character and order of importance as compared with the different weighting of
factors permitted in the US.INTRODUCTION BY MALCOLM GAMMIE
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Optional CBT or HST there would be both a single measure of profit per entity and a
uniform formula. This compares with the situation in the US, for example, where there
is a single starting point with the federal definition of taxable profit but the formulae
that states apply to taxable profit may differ.
Three illustrations demonstrate how a common base and uniform formula differs from
the situation in the US (common base but diverging formulae) and under HST (uniform
formula but divergent tax bases):
1.  A federal measure of taxable profits of 100 adopted in 15 states, each of which may
choose its own formula to divide those profits. In this case, we can easily envisage
a) that the choice of different formulae may lead to more than or less than 100 in
aggregate being taxed and b) that each state may choose the formula factors (or
weightings) in order to attracting investment to itself.
2.  A single measure of taxable profits under HST where the profit figure for an entity
may be 95, 97.5 or 100, depending on its choice of home state, but each of those
figures is allocated under a uniform formula. In this case, the amount taxed will be
95, 97.5 or 100, depending upon the choice of home state.
In effect, a member state may choose its tax base (within the common model) to
encourage companies to adopt that state as their home state.
22 It has little scope,
however, to define its tax base to attract investment to that state in preference to
others.
23 This is because changes in its tax base extend throughout the Community
for companies adopting that state as their home state and companies headquartered
elsewhere can only benefit from such changes by not opting for HST.
3.  Taxable profits of 100 under an agreed common corporate tax base with that figure
being allocated under a uniform formula. In this case, the amount taxed will be 100
wherever the investment is made within the Community and wherever a company
chooses to establish itself.
This illustrates the superiority of a common base, whether it is a mandatory system
or the company’s choice under an optional system. Under Optional CBT, however,
member states remain free to attract investment under their domestic systems by
offering more favourable measures of profits than those available under the common
base. Thus, enterprises operating in states that offer taxable profits of 95 and 97.5
may decide not to choose a common base that produces taxable profits of 100.
24
                                                
22 It is this aspect that proponents say will encourage market-led convergence of EU corporate tax
systems.
23 The continuing ability of member states to set their own tax rate is an element of both HST and
Optional CBT that may continue to affect where companies invest. The importance of the tax rate will
also depend upon the factors used in the uniform formula and therefore how far different investments will
result in profits being attributed to a member state with a lower tax rate.
24 HST is also proposed to be optional, certainly for existing rather than new enterprises, so that
companies could if they preferred continue to be taxed as at present, under the different rules of each
member state in which they, their branches and subsidiaries operate. Nevertheless, the basic incentive for
companies is not to opt out of HST but to choose the home state whose rules best suit their activities. It is
envisaged that this would create the necessary pressure for convergence of tax bases amongst member
states. This would not be convergence to ‘zero’ or abolition because HST envisages that member statesCEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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And the common base might be undermined if every member state were to adopt a
more favourable measure of profits.
25
It is likely that for each company there may be a variety of reasons and different
gains and losses in choosing the common base rather than continuing with 15
different member state systems, even if more favourable. If Optional CBT is
successful in reducing the costs of dealing with 15 different sets of tax
measurement, accounting and administrative rules, there should be a strong
incentive for most companies to adopt the common system, even though from a
general point of view (without considering these compliance costs) it is less
favourable than the domestic tax base.
If that is correct, the advantages of the CBT in terms of simplicity, compliance costs
and administration, compared to the present system, should over time be the leading
force for the widespread adoption of the system and, in turn, for the convergence of
domestic systems to the European common base.
HST and Optional CBT as paths to a solution
The precise economic effects of HST and of making the common base optional are
almost certainly less clear than these simple illustrations suggest and, in reality, it seems
likely to be quite difficult to reach a clear conclusion on their relative economic merits.
Apart from anything else, any comparison of the two presents the immediate difficulty
that it is easier through looking at existing member state rules to assess the likely
parameters of an acceptable tax base under HST than it is to know which of those rules
would be agreed upon for adoption in every member state as the common base.
In this respect, as Claudio Radaelli suggests, the choices involved in selecting ex ante a
common tax base may not be driven by economic or ‘optimal’ considerations.
26 If, as a
result, the common base were ‘uncompetitive’ in world terms business might not
consider it a satisfactory outcome. The principal advantage of making the common base
optional may then be that companies need not opt into an uncompetitive common base.
This suggests that member states may be unlikely at the outset to agree on an
uncompetitive system. It leaves open, however, the mechanism through which member
states would agree changes to the common tax base to give it necessary flexibility as a
competitive system.
27
                                                                                                                                              
establish the broad parameters of the system, and that member states will not be able to step outside those
parameters.
25 Member states may in any event wish to restrict the common base to companies of a certain size. In this
way they would be able to maintain different systems for small- and medium-sized enterprises, reflecting
the fact that the taxation of those enterprises may have to be more closely aligned to the domestic
personal tax system (including that for unincorporated businesses) than a common base would imply.
26 Because Optional CBT retains intact the domestic tax base, it requires (in contrast to the Ruding
Committee proposals) agreement on a common tax base at the outset rather than through a process of
agreement on measures that member states can introduce over time.
27 This point is true whether CBT is optional or not. The option would, however, offer some incentive for
member states to change uncompetitive aspects of the common base depending on the terms of the option
(i.e. whether companies which had already opted-in could later opt-out). This issue does not arise under
HST where the definition of the tax base remains within the competence of each member state subject toINTRODUCTION BY MALCOLM GAMMIE
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Despite the strongly held views of members of the Task Force both for and against HST
and Optional CBT, what should be remembered is that neither are proposed as ideal
solutions but as practical steps towards a system that is consistent with the realisation of
the single market. Indeed, consideration of the practical steps that would be needed for
progress towards a European corporate tax system suggests that the differences between
HST and Optional CBT are more apparent than real.
I suggest that because in seeking agreement – whether in determining the parameters of
systems that qualify within HST or in drafting the Community measures needed to
establish a common base – it seems quite unlikely that member states will aim to
specify a single answer for every aspect of profit computation. Rather, they are more
likely to agree a range of approaches, each one of which is acceptable for adoption and
which, across the range, reflects the different approaches to aspects of profit
computation currently found in the 15 member states. If I am correct in thinking that,
the real difference between HST and a common base lies solely in their approach to
implementing a common objective: the former emphasises mutual recognition at a
Community level of similar (but not identical) domestic measures; the latter emphasises
the adoption at the domestic level of one of several approaches agreed at the
Community level to be similar. It is this intuition that lies behind the observation in Part
II, that the more member state’s corporate tax systems diverge, the more difficult it is to
think of adopting HST or agreeing a common base; conversely, the more they converge,
the easier it is both to contemplate HST and to envisage reaching agreement on a
common base.
Any final assessment of the potential of HST and of Optional CBT as practical steps to
a common end must include an assessment of whether HST produces convergence or
growing diversity of tax bases, and whether an Optional CBT preserves the integrity of
the agreement on the common base or would involve continuing competition between
(and, as a result, erosion of) both the common and domestic tax bases.
What is clear is that either idea requires assessment from a variety of economic,
practical and political standpoints, and in particular in terms of what member states may
be able to agree for corporate taxation in Europe.
                                                                                                                                              
the parameters agreed at the outset. The impact of these parameters on member state actions would be
similar to the current impact of the EC Treaty freedoms on member state tax systems.9
PART I
THE NEW POLITICS OF CORPORATE TAXATION
IN THE EUROPEAN UNION
C LAUDIO M. RADAELLI
1.  Introduction
What is changing in the politics of EU corporate tax policy? What is the influence of the
new global tax environment, characterised by the inclination of the OECD to crack
down on harmful tax practices? What is the balance of power between member states,
the European Commission and the business community in the new process designed by
the European Council at Feira in June 2000? This part of the report seeks to answer
these questions by means of the following five steps:
1.  To elaborate on the basis of the analysis contained in the report of the CEPS Tax
Force on the future of the EU tax system (Radaelli, 2000).
2.  To comment on the political issues discussed by this Task Force.
28 For example,
Onno Ruding, former Chairman of the committee of independent experts set up by
the Commission in 1992 to look at corporate tax policy in the Community
(European Commission, 1992), spoke to the Task Force on the economic and
political issues raised by tax coordination. This spawned a lively debate among the
members on the issue of voting rules in taxation (specifically, unanimity versus
qualified majority voting). Further, the Task Force debated on several occasions
political issues such as the potential of the OECD action to achieve concrete results
in its battle against tax havens and harmful tax competition in general, the political
direction of the EU tax policy process (i.e. the role of business in this process, the
‘deterrence’ created by the combination of state aid policy and the code of conduct,
the conflicts which may arise in the implementation of the code) and, most
importantly perhaps, whether the EU is effectively tackling the real corporate tax
issues.
3.  To assess the progress made by the EU in corporate tax policy. When the report of
the CEPS Task Force on the Future of Tax Policy in the EU was released, most
observers thought that the tax package proposed by the Commission to the Council
(consisting of the code of conduct, the proposal for a tax directive on savings and
the proposal for a directive on cross-border interest and royalties payments) was in
serious danger. The political problems created by the proposal on the taxation for
minimum taxation of savings appeared insurmountable. Yet the process has moved
on, and important results have been achieved over the last twelve months or so.
There is renewed momentum on the coordination of corporate taxes in Europe, and
this report will describe and assess the new political dynamics at work.
4.  To situate the EU corporate tax initiatives in the context of the OECD action. This is
important because the political success of the EU policy hinges on the possibility to
                                                
28 The comments presented in this part of the report fall under the responsibility of the author. They
should not be attributed to the Task Force. Indeed, there were different opinions within the Task Force in
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exploit a favourable ‘global policy environment’. This report will not deal with the
details of the OECD programme, but will nonetheless assess to what extent the
politics of the OECD tax initiatives has an impact on the dynamics of EU corporate
tax policy.
5.  Finally, and most importantly, to assess the EU corporate tax policy and to show
how the proposals contained in the policy recommendations can find ‘political
space’ in the agenda of the EU institutions.
Part I of the report is organised in four sections. Section 1 looks at the policy
developments at the OECD level. Section 2 reviews the progress at the EU table so far,
whereas Section 3 highlights the political implications and the elements of the changing
political scenario of EU direct tax policy. Section 4 concludes.
2.  The OECD arena: More voices in the policy process, more politicisation,
more cooperation with business
Why is the OECD arena relevant for EU tax policy dynamics? Although the EU code of
conduct and the OECD initiative against harmful tax practices (OECD, 1998) share
different goals and cover different types of economic activity (see the analysis contained
in CEPS, 2000), there are areas in which they overlap. Further, politically the EU line
against ‘harmful tax competition’ benefits from a similar orientation at the OECD level.
Further to the OECD (1998) report on harmful tax competition – which contained 19
detailed recommendations to combat unfair tax practices both within the OECD and in
tax havens outside the organisation – a second report was published in June 2000
(OECD, 2000b). This report identifies 47 tax regimes in OECD countries that are
‘potentially harmful’. Unsurprisingly, the list includes the Belgian coordination centres
and the Irish international financial service centres. Interestingly, the OECD has made
the cautious political choice not to say whether these regimes are harmful or not. They
are ‘potentially harmful’ – the OECD will try to assess whether they are actually
harmful or not between now and the year 2003.
Jurisdictions outside the OECD were treated differently in that the OECD felt there was
enough evidence to list 35 non-members as actually harmful. It is important to
distinguish between the original plan of the OECD and the sequence of events that
brought the Paris-based organisation to re-focus its project. The original plan was based
on a tight deadline – July 2001 – for the targeted 35 jurisdictions to endorse the
principles stated by the OECD. Politically, the plan was based on a couple of
assumptions about power relations. One assumption was that the OECD chorus would
be compact in defending the campaign against harmful tax competitions. The other was
that the scattered world of tax havens would not have found the political homogeneity
necessary to make their voice heard in the debate. Surely, tax havens would have used
different tactics to get around the OECD imperatives. But – the OECD reasoned – they
would not have been able to act together. Neither would they have found defensible
arguments in the debate. The events did not quite unfold the way the OECD wanted.
Although the plan was not derailed, and the press has exaggerated certain differences
within the OECD countries, it remains true that:
1.  The July 2001 deadline was brought forward.CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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2.  The OECD had to re-focus the political implications of the plan. However, for the
reasons explained below, we do not think that the long-term tax policy beliefs of the
OECD plan ever changed between the 1998 report and now.
3.  There have been signs of political antagonism coming from the world of tax havens.
These three points, however, need a qualification. After 11 September 2001, the
political determination to eradicate terrorism and its financial ramifications is such that
all principles of transparency and exchange of information are about to find an
overwhelming support in the US and throughout the world. Therefore, certain
hesitations on the OECD plan expressed by the US Treasury in the first part of the year
2001 and certain forms of antagonism coming from tax havens (and their supporters in
major economies) should be re-assessed in the light of the possible tax implications of
the ‘war on terror’. But before we draw conclusions, let us follow the events a bit more
closely.
The original plan of the OECD was that 35 jurisdictions had to express a commitment to
cooperation with the OECD before the deadline of July 2001. Further to that, the
uncooperative jurisdictions – this was the threat of the OECD – would be targeted by
'defensive measures'. For example, a charge on transactions with non-cooperative tax
havens, withholding taxes, denial of foreign tax credit or participation exemption, and
even the withdrawal of non-essential economic assistance.
In November 2000, the OECD issued a Memorandum of Understanding
29 with the aim
of facilitating dialogue with the blacklisted 35 non-OECD jurisdictions. The
memorandum provides a framework for the relationship between the OECD and the tax
havens in that it establishes the steps that tax havens have to take in order to express
publicly their commitment to ‘transparency, non-discrimination and effective co-
operation’. All 35 jurisdictions received the memorandum accompanied by a letter of
the OECD. In November 2000, the OECD decided to take part in three ‘regional
conferences’ aimed at facilitating cooperation and dialogue with offshore jurisdictions.
Further to that, the Netherlands Antilles, the Isle of Man, and the Seychelles took a
public commitment to reform their tax systems by the deadline December 2005.
30 It is
not entirely clear whether this commitment will end up in significant reforms of the tax
regimes in the direction suggested by the OECD. For example, some commentators
noted that the Isle of Man government said that it would make the tax changes requested
by the OECD ‘only when every OECD nation agrees to abide by the same rules’.
31
In its effort to collect a high number of signatures to its Memorandum of
Understanding, the OECD has promoted dialogue with tax havens. An important step
was taken by the so-called ‘new global tax forum’ created at a meeting hosted by
Barbados in early January 2001. The forum includes 13 members, among which OECD
nations, members of the Commonwealth Secretariat (Malaysia and Malta), the British
                                                
29 See http://www.oecd.org/media/release/nw00-123a.htm. The text of the Memorandum is available at
http://www.oecd.org/media/MOUrev20novR1.pdf.
30 They follow other six jurisdictions (Bermuda, the Cayman Islands, Cyprus, Malta, Mauritius, and San
Marino) which had already expressed their intention to cooperage with the OECD.
31 R. Goulder, ‘Centre for Freedom and Prosperity encourages Bahamas to defend tax policies’, Tax Notes
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Virgin Islands, low-tax jurisdictions from the Pacific Island Forum (the Cook Islands
and Vanuatu) and members from the Caribbean region. At the Barbados meeting, the
low-tax jurisdictions insisted on a number of points. First, they wanted the OECD to
scrap the Memorandum of Understanding, arguing that they had not been consulted
before the introduction of this policy instrument, Second, the Commonwealth
Secretariat asked the OECD to remove the threat of sanctions against uncooperative
jurisdictions. Third, the Pacific Island Forum wanted the OECD to postpone the
deadline of July 2001, arguing that time was needed to evaluate the implications of the
OECD initiative against harmful tax competition and to think through the necessary
steps. None of these three points was accepted by the OECD. Journalistic sources hinted
that the new global tax forum raised among the blacklisted jurisdictions the expectation
to be able to negotiate collectively with the OECD. But the latter responded that it was
still demanding individual commitments ‘rather than forge a multilateral agreement on
reform’.
32 Although the requests of tax havens were rejected by the OECD, the
Barbados meeting signalled a change in the process. The change was political in that the
OECD has abandoned the ambition of being the only voice in the process, dictating
‘take or leave it’ conditions to small low-tax jurisdictions.
33 The tax havens have
achieved some results in terms of the process (that is, the point that dialogue and mutual
understanding should be the preferred means of action), although not necessarily in
terms of the outcomes of the process.
The political strength of the positions advanced by low-tax jurisdictions remains
modest, but it was accompanied by the politicisation of the debate in the US. Indeed, at
least up until the launch of the ‘war on terror’, the major opposition to the OECD plan
seemed to come from pro-tax havens lobbying in the US, and the sympathetic ears that
lobbyists found in some quarters of the Republican Party. A Washington-based
lobbying organisation, The Center for Freedom and Prosperity (CFP), was recently
established.
34 CFP members visited offshore jurisdictions and started lobbying in
Washington in the year 2000.
35 Although CFP forces should not be overestimated, in
the first part of 2001 its campaign raised the profile and to some extent the legitimacy of
those who argue that tax competition is always beneficial and that there is no such thing
as harmful tax competition.
‘The’ important issue thus became to what extent the new US administration would
support the OECD project against harmful tax practices. Undoubtedly, the tax policy
preferences of the previous US administration, combined with political apprehension
about unbridled tax competition in the French, German, and Japanese governments,
were instrumental in setting the tax agenda of the OECD. Signals coming from certain
areas of the Republican camp seemed somewhat sceptical of the OECD initiative. In
September 2000, the House majority leader Richard Armey wrote a letter to the then US
                                                
32 Michael Peel, ‘OECD steps up tax haven drive’, Financial Times, 19 March 2001.
33 The point was made by R. Goulder, ‘OECD, blacklisted tax havens reach landmark agreement’,  Tax
Notes International, 15 January 2001, pp. 228-230. He also added: ‘from this date forward, the handling
of the tax haven controversy has been transplanted from inside the OECD to this new independent body
[the global tax forum] at which the OECD shares an equal voice with the tax havens’ (p. 230).
34 See www.freedomandprosperity.org.
R. Goulder, ‘New coalition strikes back at OECD tax haven campaign’,  Tax Notes International, 11
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Treasury Secretary, Lawrence Summers, in which the OECD is portrayed as a ‘tax
cartel’. On 3 January 2001, US representative Sam Johnson, a Republican from Texas,
wrote to the OECD Secretary General making the point that the OECD is focusing on
the wrong problem and is using instruments that may violate WTO obligations (the
reference is to sanctions that OECD members should use against uncooperative
jurisdictions after July 2001). In March 2001, Armey wrote a second letter, this time
posted to the new US Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, describing the OECD project as
‘a global tax cartel for the benefit of a small handful of high-tax nations’. He argued that
the OECD initiative is ‘fatally flawed and contrary to America's interests’.
36 A trio of
US legislators, among them the chair of the Foreign Affairs Committee at the US Senate
(Jesse Helms), criticised openly the OECD in their separate letters to the US Treasury.
37
US Senator Don Nickles, a Republican assistant majority leader of the Senate, used his
influential position to argue in yet another letter to O'Neill that the ‘financial
protectionism of OECD nations’ is ‘contrary to America's economic interests’ because
tax competition ‘keeps politicians in check and enhances economic growth’.
38 And a
Democrat from the Virgin Islands (and Congressional black caucus member), Delegate
Donna M. Christensen, stepped up pressure on O'Neill with her 12 March 2001 letter in
which she argues that ‘wealthy OECD should not have the right to rewrite the rules of
international commerce on taxation simply because they are upset that investors and
entrepreneurs are seeking higher after-tax returns’.
39
The combination of the new foreign policy agenda of the Bush administration
40 and the
lobbying efforts described above produced a change in the US position on international
tax policy in spring 2001. The new US Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, appeared less
sympathetic than his predecessor Larry Summers towards the OECD plan, as shown by
some comments at press conferences in February and March 2001.
41 In April 2001 the
Chicago Sun-Times reported that US Assistant Treasury Secretary Mark Weinberger
expressed doubts about the American intention to use sanctions against tax havens.
42
                                                
36 C. Scott, ‘House Majority leader, Congressional black caucus member join growing list of US
lawmakers opposed to OECD tax haven campaign’, Tax Notes International, 26 March 2001, pp. 1479-
1480.
37 R. Goulder, ‘Trio of US legislators question OECD tax haven initiative’, Tax Notes International, 19
March 2001, pp. 1339-1340.
38 R.  Goulder, ‘US Senator questions OECD policy on tax competition’,  Tax Notes International, 26
February 2001, pp. 944-945.
39 C. Scott, ‘House Majority leader, Congressional black caucus member join growing list of US
lawmakers opposed to OECD tax haven campaign’, Tax Notes International, 26 March 2001, pp. 1479-
1480.
40 Some observers think that the lack of support for the environmental policy targets established at Kyoto
shows that the Bush administration is less supportive of international policy cooperation than the Clinton
administration. The Financial Times (‘US assailed at OECD meeting’, 18 May 2001, p. 10) reported that
EU ministers explain the US position on both taxes and environmental policy as components of a
changing US attitude towards international policy cooperation.
41 O'Neill admitted that the US position on the OECD plan is ‘a complicated question’. Pressed by the
journalists, he added: ‘I guess I would take a pass at the moment on whether or not we [the US], as an
independent entity, want to be strictly allied with what the OECD has said’. This statement is taken by
Scott, ‘US Treasury Secretary says US position on OECD tax harmonisation drive is a complicated
question’, Tax Notes International, 26 February 2001, pp. 943-944.
42 The statement was reported by the Chicago Sun-Times on 19 April 2001 (http://www.suntimes.com).PART I BY CLAUDIO M. RADAELLI
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Eventually, O'Neill made a statement on 10 May 2001 in which he clarified the position
on the OECD initiative. In his statement,
43 O'Neill argues that ‘We have an obligation to
enforce our tax laws as written because failing to do so undermines the confidence of
honest taxpaying Americans in the fairness of our tax system. We cannot turn a blind
eye toward tax cheating in any form. That means pursuing those who illegally evade
taxes by hiding income in offshore accounts’. In order to achieve these goals – O'Neill
continues – the US can use domestic tax laws, bilateral cooperation (e.g. tax treaties),
and ‘in appropriate circumstances, organisations like the OECD’ which ‘can be used to
build a framework for exchanging specific and limited  information necessary for the
prosecution of illegal activity’ (emphasis added).
Having expressed his qualified support for the OECD, O'Neill made three negative
comments about the current plan against harmful tax practices. Firstly, the US is against
‘over-broad information exchanges’. Secondly, O'Neill's statement shares ‘many of the
serious concerns that have been expressed recently about the direction of the OECD
initiative’. The target of this negative comment is ‘the underlying premise that low tax
rates are somehow suspect and the notion that any country, or group of countries, should
interfere in any other country's decision about how to structure its own tax system. The
United States does not support efforts to dictate to any country what its own tax rates or
tax system should be, and will not participate in any initiative to harmonise world tax
systems’. This second point seems to express some sympathy towards the position of
those US lobbyists and legislators who argue that the OECD plan contains the hidden
agenda of raising (or at least harmonising) tax rates across the world. The third point is
probably the most important one because it sets the limits of the US involvement in the
OECD policy against tax havens. In O'Neill’s own words, the OECD initiative ‘must be
refocused on the core element that is our common goal: the need for countries to be able
to obtain specific information from other countries upon request in order to prevent the
illegal evasion of their tax laws by the dishonest few. In its current form, the project is
too broad and it is not in line with this Administration's tax and economic priorities’.
Essentially, the US made clear in May 2001 that it supported the goals of obtaining
more exchange of information to prevent tax evasion, but demanded a re-orientation of
the project to avoid confusion on the issues of harmonisation of rates and tax systems.
In Paris, the OECD had to respond to this explicit demand from the US. It also had to
counteract the fact that out of the 35 ‘harmful’ jurisdictions, 31 had not accepted the
idea of implementing the principles of a ‘fair’ tax world designed by the major
economies. Between June and July 2001, a new position of agreement emerged within
the OECD. The agreement is based on one practical step and one principle. The
practical step is that the deadline for the 35 jurisdictions was extended to April 2003.
This means that the deadline for the revision of potentially harmful regimes in OECD
members coincides with the deadline for the non-OECD members. Accordingly, the
OECD members can no longer ask tax havens to undertake reforms without putting
their own house in order first.
The principle is that the OECD project is not targeting low tax regimes per se. Nor is it
concerned with harmonising taxes in the world. Instead the main goal of the OECD plan
is to promote the exchange of information and the necessary legal mechanisms for that
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purpose. It is important to observe that this is not a new principle. Since May 1996,
when the communiqué issued following an OECD ministerial meeting endorsed the
decision to fight tax degradation, not a single OECD document has mentioned such
issues as the equalisation of tax rates. The 1998 report makes the clear point that
exchange of information is a core objective of the initiative. Thus, the OECD plan has
not been refocused in terms of principles or broad tax policy beliefs, but the emphasis
has somewhat shifted from tax considerations to the wider issues of exchange of
information, transparency and bank secrecy. In a sense, the OECD initiative today is
‘less tax-centred and more exchange of information-focused’ than it was in the period
1998-2000.
In light of these events, what can one expect now? The theme of fighting harmful tax
competition has become openly politicised. Organisations such as the Centre for
Freedom and Prosperity have sought to strike back at the OECD campaign, trying to
undermine its legitimacy. Commentators speak of a ‘new coalition’, casting them in the
role of the underdog David (that is, tax-competitive small jurisdictions) in his battle
against Goliath (i.e. the member countries of the OECD).
44 Pro-tax competition
lobbying has been intense in the US, its main goal being to have the US withdraw its
support from the initiatives of the OECD in this field.
The US, however, is quite pleased with the current direction taken by the OECD
project. It has also reiterated the strong support for the battle against money laundering
undertaken by the Financial Action Task Force – an independent body affiliated with
the OECD.
45 Cooperation and international tax enforcement have always been top
priorities in the US agenda for international tax policy. The tragic events of 11
September 2001 have made the political determination to fight for financial
transparency even stronger, and the US seems willing to be the major actor in this
battle. Arguably, O’Neill would not make today the negative comment on ‘over-broad
exchange of information’ that he made on 10 May 2001. The ‘war on terror’ may lead
O’Neill to increase the US Treasury’s support for all OECD initiatives aimed at a more
transparent world. Low or even zero tax rates per se may not represent a major problem
in the new scenario, but tax regimes fenced by bank secrecy and no exchange of
information will easily get into trouble.
The open question is whether the ‘war on terror’ will go so far as to authorise
enforcement of tax laws on an extraterritorial basis and allow ‘fishing expeditions’
abroad. It is now possible to imagine a world where bank secrecy and other barriers to
exchange of information are progressively demolished if money laundering, crime, and
terrorism are involved. But the case for full exchange of information based only on tax
considerations is more difficult.
46 There is also the problem created by the definition of
crime: jurisdiction A may classify some forms of tax evasion as crime, and hence may
wish to look through the veil of bank secrecy abroad, but jurisdiction B may not classify
the same transactions as crime, and therefore may contest the right of jurisdiction A to
                                                
44 R. Goulder, ‘New coalition strikes back at OECD tax haven campaign’,  Tax Notes International, 11
December 2000, pp. 2650-2654.
45 The US position on the OECD plan as it stands now and on the fight against money laundering was
reported inter alia by Tax Notes International, 25 June 2001.
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enforce its own definition of crime abroad. On balance, however, one should expect full
agreement within the OECD members about what needs to be done in terms of financial
transparency and exchange of information.
Another element that is bound to shape future developments is the confrontation
between the targeted jurisdictions and the OECD members. Some of the 35 jurisdictions
are in a weak position as they have been targeted both for tax reasons and for suspected
money laundering (by the Financial Action Task Force). Their position in the post-11
September 2001 world is extremely weak. But the jurisdictions which are eminently
concerned about tax issues may play the game with the OECD by combining forces.
Indeed, some jurisdictions set up an organisation called the International Tax and
Investment Organisation (ITIO).
47 The idea is to use the ITIO as a player in the dialogue
with the OECD. ITIO has now sent a list of 17 questions to the OECD, seeking specific
answers on matters arising from the Memorandum of Understanding and other aspects
of the OECD campaign against harmful tax competition.
48 One political assumption of
the original OECD plan – that is, the asymmetry of power relations between a single
OECD chorus and a scattered collection of tax havens – may turn out to be wrong in
that tax havens may seek to build a common front.
Considerations about time, timing and tempo are of paramount importance at this
stage:
49 Will the OECD be able to break through the front of tax havens and secure the
requisite number of signatures to its Memorandum of Understanding? And will OECD
member states pull the trigger of defensive measures in 2003? And will the review of
the OECD members’ preferential tax regimes be successfully completed by then?
In any case, will the sanctions be effective? An economist has already raised doubts
about the effectiveness of possible economic sanctions (Devereux, 2000). In fact, the
members of the OECD have always had the possibility to take unilateral measures
against small uncooperative tax havens. Thus, ‘if there is a cost to taking further action
which has prevented individual OECD countries from having taken it unilaterally (…),
then it seems at least possible that such countries would not be willing to take such
action in response to the prompting of the OECD’ (Devereux, 2000, p. 13).
Additionally, defensive measures such as transactional charges levied by, say, the UK
on payments to Aruba, could be irrelevant if a third country acts as an intermediary in
the transaction (Devereux, 2000). To be effective, defensive measures would have to be
very comprehensive.
The final element of the OECD scenario can be labelled ‘more cooperation with
business’. This is shown by the cooperative efforts between the OECD and BIAC
(Business and Industry Advisory Committee to the OECD, established in 1962). BIAC
was marginalised in the early days of the OECD campaign against harmful tax
competition. The Committee felt it had not been properly consulted when the OECD’s
1998 report was released (see Radaelli, 2000). At that time, the positions of business
                                                
47 At the end of April 2001, ITIO consisted of Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, the British
Virgin Islands, the Cook Islands, Dominica, Malaysia and Vanuatu.
48 C. Scott, ‘Low-tax jurisdictions press OECD to answer questions on fairness’, Tax Notes International,
14 May 2001, pp. 2411-2413.
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and the OECD appeared far apart. Now there is a new dialogue between the two. The
OECD has publicly acknowledged that it had not provided the business community an
adequate opportunity to participate in the dialogue in 1998, and today welcomes a more
cooperative relationship with BIAC on the topic of harmful tax competition. The new
climate has resulted in the release of a joint statement by the chairman of taxation and
fiscal policy of BIAC and the head of fiscal affairs at the OECD, in which they agree on
the following two points:
1)  the necessity to eliminate non-compliance with tax laws, and
2)  the fact that the OECD should not attempt to harmonise tax rates, set minimum
levels of taxation or curtail legitimate tax planning.
50 This rapprochement between
business and government is not a phenomenon unique to the OECD arena: the EU
tax policy process shows a similar trend in terms of cooperation between business
and institutions.
It is to the EU that we now turn. First, however, it is useful to re-cap on the critical
elements that will shape the future of the OECD ‘harmful tax competition’ plan. The
success of the OECD plan hinges on the solution to three problems:
1.  The ‘focus’ problem. Originally, the plan was all about attacking harmful tax
competition. But now ‘regulatory and fiscal transparency’ lie the core of the
initiative. To avoid derailment, the OECD must stick to the thrust of the project, and
above all avoid confusion and disagreement about the practical implications in terms
of future policy, and build on the US-driven battle against regimes which provide
financial shelters for terrorism.
2.  The ‘credibility’ problem. Credibility is undermined by the observation that the
Memorandum of Understanding requires non-OECD members to go beyond the
obligations of the OECD members.
51 As the Financial Times put it (14 May 2001),
to set a credible example to the rest of the world, they [the OECD countries] need
first to set their own houses in order. The alignment of the deadlines for OECD
members and the 35 jurisdictions is an important step in this direction. To be
credible, the OECD has to show that its members are really removing the harmful
components of their tax regimes. Incidentally, a number of regimes are
simultaneously the target of both the OECD review and the EU code of conduct. A
lack of credibility in the former forum would put the latter exercise in jeopardy.
3.  The ‘compensation’ problem. As averred, there is scepticism over the possibility to
enforce effective sanctions against tax havens. Someone has argued that the
defensive measures may go against the obligations set by the World Trade
Organisation,
52 although we did not find additional evidence of lawyers questioning
the sanctions on the basis of WTO obligations. The most acute problem is political.
Tax coordination must include a package of compensation to small aggressive
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sovereignty’, Tax Notes International, 7 May 2001.
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jurisdictions if it has to be Pareto efficient, be perceived as fair, and ultimately be
successful. However, as Michael Keen (1999, p. 61) has observed, ‘explicit
compensation is for some reason quite rare in international relations, and the
compensation of rather prosperous tax havens for ceasing to behave parasitically
seems some way from practical politics’. To solve the puzzle of compensation, the
OECD needs creativity in the use of policy instruments, and, arguably, package
deals that may include non-tax components.
3.  The current EU strategy: Progress, ambiguity and connected games
The current direct tax policy of the EU (formalised with the ECOFIN agreement OJ C 2,
6.1.1998) is based on a three-piece tax package and a fourth element concerning fiscal
state aid. The tax package includes the code of conduct, a proposal for a directive on the
minimum taxation of EU non-residents and a proposal for a directive against the double
taxation of multinationals. These three elements are formally bundled, which means that
lack of agreement on one element makes agreement on the other two elements
impossible. Let us now take a look at what's in the package.
The first element of the 1997 agreement is a voluntary code-of-conduct on business
taxation (to be discussed below). The second component of the deal is the commitment
to ensure a minimum of effective taxation of savings within the Community. In 1997,
the Council requested the Commission to come up with a proposal for a directive and
set a few points around which the proposal should be fleshed out. Following this
invitation, the Commission presented a proposal for exchange of information or a 20%
withholding tax on interest paid to non-resident EU citizens in May 1998.
53 This is the
proposal that raised many objections in the City of London, worried by the possibility
that capital markets would react negatively to the European tax on savings, and migrate
elsewhere (Baron, 1999). Further to an unsuccessful attempt to mitigate the worries of
the British delegation in Helsinki (December 1999), the EU debate has veered towards
exchange of information as the best option. This would mean the abolition of bank
secrecy for EU non-residents. The Feira EU summit (20 June 2000) recognised the
possibility to opt for the co-existence model (that is, withholding tax or exchange of
information) for a limited period of seven years, after which all countries will run a
regime of automatic exchange of information among tax authorities.
At Feira, the EU leaders dropped the May 1998 proposal for the taxation of savings, but
set the coordinates for a new one.
54 They agreed on a process that should lead to the
approval (unanimity voting applies) of a three-piece package (a directive on the taxation
of EU non-residents’ savings, a directive on interest and royalties and the full
implementation of the code-of-conduct) by ‘no later than 31 December 2002’ provided
that (in the area of the taxation of savings) third countries
55 implement equivalent
measures and that the dependent or associated territories of EU countries (the Channel
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ensure effective taxation of savings income in the form of interest payments within the Community
COM(2001) 400 Brussels, 18/07/2001.
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Islands, Isle of Man and the territories in the Caribbean) enact the same measures as the
EU member states. By 2009, all member states should switch to exchange of
information as the rule for the taxation of EU non-residents’ savings. At Feira, the
European Council endorsed only a timetable, but, in doing so, it generated momentum
for tax coordination. It also established the principle that the exchange of information
(rather than withholding taxes on non-residents’ savings) is the main target of the EU.
Another important step was taken at the ECOFIN Council meeting of 27 November
2000, when the French Presidency secured an interim deal for those countries that –
within the time limitations set at Feira – want to use withholding taxes rather than
exchange of information. Austria, Belgium and Luxembourg will levy a withholding tax
at 15% for three years. After that, the tax rate will go up to 20%. A regime for the so-
called grandfathering of Eurobonds was also agreed. Thus some coordinates of the
proposal for the taxation of savings are in place. But for the proposal to become a
directive, it will be necessary to demonstrate that the third countries listed at Feira enact
equivalent measures.
The third element is the proposal for a directive on cross-border payments of interests
and royalties. This is a typical single-market tax measure. Conceptually, it has nothing
to do with the EU fight against harmful tax competition. As such, the proposal should
have been approved a long time ago. However, the three elements of the package are
still linked together.
The final element concerns fiscal aids. This is an element of the 1997 agreement,
although technically it falls outside the tax package that has yet to be finalised. What is
the reason behind the inclusion of state aid in the 1997 agreement? Simply put, special
tax regimes have too often been built under the rubric of legitimate state aid policy, thus
circumventing the scrutiny of the tax Directorate of the Commission. The essential point
here is the connection between tax policy and state aid policy. In a press release (23
February 2000), Mario Monti stated that the DG for competition will examine all the
relevant cases of fiscal state aids in business taxation, so as to allow the Commission to
comply fully and promptly with its own institutional obligations. The connection
between state aids and taxation requires an examination of the progress made in the
code-of-conduct. It is to the code that we now turn.
Within the current strategy to attack harmful tax competition, the code is the main
instrument targeting corporate taxation. The code of conduct defines harmful tax
competition. It also includes general provisions for standstill and later rollback of
harmful tax regimes. A Council group (the so-called Primarolo Group, dubbed after its
chair, British MP Paymaster General Dawn Primarolo) reported on the implementation
of the code to the Council on 29 November 1999 (SN 4901/99). The Helsinki summit
(December 1999), however, was unable to agree on the Primarolo report. The important
political point is that while the criteria listed in the code-of-conduct were agreed by all
member states on 1 December 1997, the Group's  report was not. Consequently,
reluctant member states can always rely on this area of disagreement in the process of
implementation of the code. The November 1999 report listed 66 harmful tax regimes.
But the report reflected either the unanimous opinion of the members of the group or the
various opinions expressed in the course of the discussion. The reservations entered by
some delegations to the conclusions of the Primarolo Group speak volumes on the
degree of agreement on what needs to be done in the near future. Whenever CouncilPART I BY CLAUDIO M. RADAELLI
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documents refer to the code of conduct group's deliberations, they indeed refer to broad
consensus but not necessarily unanimity.
56
This ambiguity – in terms of the extent of substantive agreement among the 15 countries
– may affect the implementation of the code. For example, in a progress report
presented to the Council in November 2000, although all delegations agreed on the
principles of standstill and rollback, one delegation objected to the specific criteria used
to implement the principles. Nevertheless, the code of conduct group was able to meet
every month since the European Council of Feira. Paradoxically, the group seems able
to proceed in detailed analyses of the harmful tax regimes and the criteria for rollback,
although the 15 countries have not resolved some fundamental issues regarding what
they really want to achieve. The outcome is that at every meeting of the group there is
some area of agreement, but if one scratches below the surface one finds that there is
disagreement on what the real implications of the agreement are! As stated above, the
code is still a component of the tax package to be agreed in 2003. Until then, member
states have all sorts of  ‘exit’ options if they do not want to abide by the decisions of the
group. For example, if a country – possibly as a consequence of a change of government
– does not want to roll back a tax regime, only peer pressure can be used to assure
compliance and enforcement.
The problem of uncertainty is compounded by the relationship between the code and the
state aid policy of the Commission. Technically, the Commission can decide to open a
formal procedure on some of the 66 measures identified by the Primarolo Group at any
time. Further, the Commission can open procedures on fiscal aids that were not covered
by the code (or were covered but found not harmful) if these aids are judged in potential
collision with the Treaty articles on competition policy. In a sense, the Commission
received a broad mandate in December 1997, when ECOFIN asked the Commissioner
for competition policy to re-consider state aid policy in the light of the strategy to fight
harmful tax competition.
There is a big difference between a non-binding instrument, the code of conduct, and
state aids, where the Commission has considerable power. However, politically the
‘arenas’ of the code and state aids are connected. The Commission gains considerable
leverage from these nested arenas. Indeed, it seems that the Commission has exploited
the connection between the code and state aids by using tempo (defined here as the rate
of speed of decisions). When the ‘decisional speed’ in the code of conduct arena
decreases, the Commission gets ready for action in terms of competition policy. When
the process in the area of the code (and more generally the tax package) re-starts, DG
Competition seems inclined to a prudent ‘wait and see’ policy. For example, during the
months preceding the breakthrough of 27 November 2000, when the chances of making
progress on the code and the tax bundle appeared low, DG Competition ‘loaded the
gun’ by starting preliminary investigations on selected fiscal aids. Formal state aid
procedures were not open however, to keep pressure on the national delegations
negotiating in the code arena. The gun was loaded, but the trigger was not pulled. Soon
after the November breakthrough, DG Competition manifested no intention to open
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formal procedures against the fiscal aids object of the preliminary investigation. Clearly,
this is a political mechanism of threats, sanctions and rewards. Member states are
rewarded for their ‘good behaviour’ at the code-of-conduct table by putting a hold on
state aid procedures. Some delegations have sought to take advantage of this connection
between code and fiscal aids by stating the following: in the presence of compliance
with the recommendations of the Primarolo Group, a member state should be openly
rewarded by DG Competition's promise not to start state aid procedures. This is clearly
unacceptable: the Commission cannot make this type of deals. However, it remains true
that the Commission is clearly taking into account progress and compliance in the code-
of-conduct group in the formulation of its state aid policy.
Concluding on this point, the link between state aids and the code favours the
Commission by giving it some political leverage in terms of threat, rewards and
sanctions. An example was provided by the announcement on 11 July 2001 of a formal
investigation of the Commission into 11 business tax schemes in 8 member states under
Art. 88(2) of the EC Treaty.
57  This signal was certainly heard by the national delegates
sitting at the code-of-conduct table.
To conclude, the state of play remains problematic. Yet there is evidence that,
notwithstanding the uncertainty surrounding the Primarolo Report, and the fact that the
full implementation of the code is linked to progress in the other areas of the tax policy
package, the code is already generating some policy change. For example, recent
changes in the Netherlands’ intermediate royalty and interest companies, advance
pricing agreements and advance ruling practices have been linked to the intention of the
Dutch government to comply with the criteria listed by the code
58.  Should further
evidence point in this direction, one should conclude that the code has acquired a life of
its own (that is, the power to create domestic policy change independently of the
approval of the package). At the moment, however, this conclusion would be premature.
4.  New political dynamics in EU tax policy
This section provides an interpretation of the new political dynamics at work in the EU
direct tax policy process. Its aim is not to predict the future, but to read and decode
signals that, although relatively weak at the moment, may well give shape to the future
scenario of EU taxation. The Commission provided a clear indication that it is willing to
engage in a thorough debate on the future of EU taxation with the 23 May 2001
Communication on Tax policy in the European Union: Priorities for the years ahead
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(European Commission, 2001).
The argument in this section can be outlined by dint of four propositions:
1.  There is a tendency to less and less legal harmonisation, that is, ‘traditional’ legally
binding instruments covering all the EU countries (typically, directives).
2.  By contrast, one could expect an increasing use of new policy instruments, such as
the open coordination method, enhanced cooperation and infringements (this is not a
new instrument, but its systematic use in direct tax policy would represent an
innovation).
3.  Taken together, point 1 and 2 signal a shift from a mono-thematic strategy based on
harmful tax competition to a multi-dimensional strategy of tax policy convergence,
in which harmful tax competition does not disappear, but is no longer the only show
in town.
4.  Politically, the business community has an opportunity to get back in the EU policy
process, whereas the initial stages of the harmful tax competition campaign put the
concerns of business at the very margins of the EU political initiative.
The voting issue: Is QMV the real issue?
Let us proceed point by point. To begin with, although proposals for EU directives are
still on the table (as shown by the case of savings and interest and royalties), the future
of the EU direct tax policy lies elsewhere. The inter-governmental conference (IGC) of
Nice (December 2000) indicated that a possible major avenue for more directives on tax
policy, that is, qualified majority voting (QMV), is not open yet. The enlargement of the
EU will probably re-kindle the debate about QMV in taxation. But at least for the next
four years or so there will be no QMV in taxation. Let us review the outcome of the
IGC.
The Commission went to the IGC with a proposal for the introduction of QMV in the
following tax domains (European Commission, 2000):
§ §  adoption of provisions directly governing the levying of tax and aimed at preventing
fraud, evasion or tax avoidance in order to eliminate cases of double non-taxation in
cross-border situations and to prevent circumvention of existing provisions,
particularly in the VAT field;
§ §  adoption of coordinating provisions intended to remove a direct obstacle to the
exercise of the four freedoms, and in particular to prevent discrimination and double
taxation;
§ §  measures that modernise and simplify existing Community rules in the indirect tax
area in order to eliminate distortions of competition measures that ensure a uniform
application of existing indirect taxation rules and guarantee the simple and
transparent application of such rules;
§ §  taxation measures that have as their principal objective the protection of the
environment and have a direct and significant effect on the environment measures of
coordination of social security schemes in order to facilitate the free movement of
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§ §  measures providing for minimum requirements that are necessary to allow for the
effective exercise of the free movement of persons or to prevent distortions of
competition through artificial lowering of social protections standards.
There was a chance of using the first point (that is, tax avoidance) in the case of the
proposed directive for savings. But in any case, the IGC refused the proposals of the
Commission to extend QMV in direct taxation. This does not mean that without QMV
there is no future for tax directives. The Council tends to prefer an unanimous position
even in decisions where QMV is possible. The mythology of the vote in the Council is
false: there is now enough empirical evidence to state that the Council does not vote but
rather reaches an unanimous position in a vast number of decisions technically subject
to QMV. The Council does not operate like a parliament in which majority and
opposition measure their respective forces by voting.
There is another reason why the insistence on QMV may be somewhat misleading. This
second argument revolves around the notion that the EU is not a state and therefore a
state-morphic view of the EU is inappropriate. Let us elaborate on this statement with a
short digression on the majoritarian principle. In democratic political systems, the
majoritarian principle is the effect (not the cause) of the existence of parliamentary
control on government (‘no taxation without representation’) and of a fully-fledged
political structure. By contrast, the EU has not developed along the lines of the state in
Western Europe (that is, by consolidating the welfare state and the tax system in the
context of the development of democratic political institutions). The EU is eminently a
regulatory political system (Majone, 1996), that is, a political system specialised in the
production of regulatory policies rather than distributive and redistributive policies. In
this sense the EU does not fit well with a state-morphic view of the political system:
redistribution and tax powers are minimal, the limited EU budget does not allow for the
growth of the welfare state, parliamentary control on the executive is very constrained,
and regulation is the only type of policy that can really thrive in the EU polity. To adopt
a majoritarian principle in tax matters could be tantamount to putting the effect before
the cause.
Additionally, regulatory policies are based on arguments of efficiency and Pareto-
optimality, whereas distribution and redistribution are based on values and political
preferences. The majoritarian principle does not perform well in regulatory policy
(Majone, 1996). Indeed, even at the level of domestic political systems, Pareto-
optimality is sought by dint of non-majoritarian bodies, such as independent agencies.
The growth of the regulatory state at the domestic level has shifted the balance of power
from parliaments to independent agencies, courts and experts. Parliaments and
majoritarian principles are still indispensable when there are decisions to be taken on
the basis of values, class conflicts or broad political options such as fairness and
redistribution. But the politics of regulation involves decisions in terms of efficiency,
and Pareto-optimality is not well served by the majoritarian principle. Considering that
the fight against harmful tax competition is a typical regulatory policy (indeed the
Commission has always made its argument in terms of the efficiency of the market), the
question arises whether QMV is really the most important issue for the future of tax
policy?PART I BY CLAUDIO M. RADAELLI
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The code of conduct: Open coordination method in disguise?
Be that as it may, the EU is moving towards new policy instruments. The Commission
remains convinced that ‘a move to qualified majority voting at least for certain tax
issues is indispensable’ (European Commission, 2001:10). But it also acknowledges
that ‘the legal basis will, for the present, remain unanimity’. The Commission then
argues, in its 23 May 2001 Communication, that ‘given the difficulties in reaching
unanimous decisions on legislative proposals, which will be compounded by
enlargement, the Community should also consider the use of alternative instruments as a
basis for initiatives in the tax field’ (European Commission, 2001, p.10).
The code-of-conduct represents the major innovation so far. Rather than being an odd
example of policy-making, the code is a case of open coordination method in disguise
(details in Radaelli, 2002). The open coordination method was introduced at the Lisbon
European Council (2000) with the aim of producing policy convergence through
instruments different from traditional harmonisation directives. The method is not based
on law-making, but on policy transfer in that the EU becomes a catalyst and a platform
for the launch of best practice. Interestingly, the method is eminently comparative: in
contrast to directives, its thrust is not to impose a single legal template on to member
states, but to suggest a menu of best practices arising from the comparison of what
different countries are doing. Countries are supposed to exchange best practice and
discuss innovative solutions to policy problems. Benchmarking, guidelines, scoreboards
and timetables (rather than directives) are the main tools of the method. Peer pressure is
the main mechanism for monitoring and evaluation.
Overall, the code of conduct fits in rather well with the description of the open
coordination method (see the description of the code in the previous section). Turning to
best practice, at first glance it seems that the code has nothing to say on this component
of the open coordination method. The criteria identified by the code do not define best
practice directly. By highlighting the harmful dimension of tax competition, however,
they show indirectly what good practice in tax policy is. In a sense, the criteria provide a
functional equivalent to best practice. The latter does not make sense in EU tax policy,
where there is no idea of what the ‘best’ or ‘good’ fiscal system should be. To
determine ‘worst’ practice is therefore the closest EU business tax policy can get to the
open coordination method's emphasis on best practice. On balance, the code can be
considered an example of the method.
Enhanced cooperation: A new window of opportunity for tax policy development?
Another possible development of the EU tax policy refers to the provisions on closer co-
operation contained in the treaties. The Treaty of Nice has introduced some
rationalisation of the treatment of differentiated integration. At least eight member states
must take part, but all must be encouraged to do so – the idea being that closer co-
operation should assist further integration. Closer cooperation has to be employed only
as a matter of last resort, hence the EU will first try to reach agreement between all
member states. If agreement cannot be reached, closer cooperation becomes a
possibility. The member states which remain ‘out’ must not hinder cooperation amongst
the ‘ins’. However, whatever is achieved under closer cooperation will not form part of
the aquis communautaire – an important point in the context of enlargement. The IGCCEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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at Nice established that the national veto at the level of the European Council is
abolished.
In the first pillar there will be only consultation of the European Parliament whenever
‘ins’ areas are formed in policies – like tax policy – subject to unanimity in the
Council.
59 To sum up then, there is the possibility to use these new provisions for issues
such as a multilateral tax treaty agreed by – say – eight countries of the Union.
Commissioner Bolkestein has already instructed his officials to identify tax policy
issues where closer cooperation can be employed.
60 The 23 May 2001 Communication
argues that enhanced cooperation could be used in direct tax policy to go beyond the
traditional forms of cooperation, namely the bilateral tax treaty (European Commission,
2001:24). There is no specific example in the Communication, but clearly enhanced
cooperation provides a new pathway to policy-making in a context in which unanimity
discourages an emphasis on traditional law-making.
Less harmonisation, but more action on infringements?
Another area of possible innovation is the use of infringements in tax policy (European
Commission, 2001). The case of the taxation of pensions illustrates the new thinking of
the Commission. In this area Commissioner Bolkestein has made it clear that the
Commission will not ask for harmonisation. Yet the Commission ‘must now adopt a
more pro-active strategy generally in the field of tax infringements and initiate actions
where it sees that Community law is being broken’.
61 This strategy has the potential to
develop a tax policy aimed at striking down the barriers to the single market. The fact
that the Commission is presenting its new initiatives on the taxation of pensions in
terms of the needs of economic operators is an indicator of the political direction taken
by Brussels. It is premature to speculate on the role of infringements in the policy
process. However, it can be observed that the Commission is taking the issue of
infringements in serious consideration and this is the kind of strategy that can take the
Commission in directions different from the fight against harmful tax competition,
specifically in the direction of a tax policy for the single market.
From a single-issue tax policy to a multi-dimensional strategy: An opportunity for the
business community?
The previous discussion indicates that EU tax policy is slowly changing. Up until a year
ago, the only show in town was harmful tax competition. True, the Commission put on
the table other proposals – such as interest and royalties, and the comprehensive review
prepared by the tax policy group in 1996 (European Commission, 1996) – but in terms
of political determination all energies were focused on harmful tax competition. Now
there are other elements in the EU tax policy. The lack of support for QMV, the possible
use of enhanced tax cooperation, the implications of the open coordination method
outside the code of conduct and the indication that the Commission may use
infringements to achieve ‘single market’ goals make the picture definitively richer than
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in the past. These points were made explicit in the 23 May Communication of the
Commission – a document which should pave the way for innovation in the tax policy
proposals coming out of Brussels (European Commission, 2001). The Communication
argues that EU tax policy ‘must, as a priority, serve the interests of citizens and business
wishing to avail themselves of the four freedoms of the internal market (…) It must,
therefore, focus on the removal of tax obstacles to the exercise of those four freedoms’
(European Commission, 2001, pp. 7-8, emphasis added).
Moreover, the Council invited the Commission to set up two panels, one on the tax
obstacles to the single market and another (made up of tax experts and economists) on
effective tax rates in the EU. At the moment of writing, the two panels have completed
their work but the Commission has not as yet issued a communication on their results.
The panels represent a channel through which the business community has been able to
provide an input to the process. They have reviewed the tax obstacles faced by
companies operating in the single market, the effective tax rates in Europe, and the most
useful tax reforms in the light of deep economic integration in Europe. This changing
scenario provides an opportunity to bring the ‘single market’ goals back into the EU tax
policy. As stated in the previous report (Radaelli, 2000), a ‘single market’ tax policy
should tackle the following problems of companies doing business in the Community:
•  The maze of different rules for the calculation of profits;
•  The need to justify prices between related and increasingly integrated enterprises as
being arm’s-length prices when no comparables may be available;
•  The presence of fifteen different tax authorities, which implies different
administrative styles and requirements, and different approaches to cross-border tax
disputes;
•  The lack of a level playing field, due to differences in the tax base and dissimilarity
of accounting standards;
•  The inability to set losses in one country against profits in another country;
•  A treaty network that is incomplete and, more importantly still, somewhat
incoherent.
5.  Conclusions: Balancing negative and positive integration
1.  The EU institutions (Council, European Parliament, and the Commission) have
made harmful tax competition the top priority in direct tax policy. The insistence of
the OECD on the same theme (although with a different project) provides an
element of ‘external’ support to what the EU is trying to achieve. There is
uncertainty about how far can the OECD initiative go, although transparency,
exchange of information, and more cooperation against financial crime are receiving
added impetus from the new political climate. Preferential tax regimes and havens
are used for various reasons: they will not necessarily fall under the rubric of the
‘war on terror’. However, the latter will boost all initiatives aiming at a reduction of
bank secrecy. Of course, at the level of specific policy initiatives, the new
international climate will not produce automatic agreement in the OECD and the
EU. The example of the proposed EU directive against money laundering – which is
making substantial progress but not without some differences of opinion betweenCEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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the Council and the European Parliament – illustrates that the translation of high-
level political commitments into practical steps takes time. Another example comes
from Germany, where the government has now proposed a register of bank accounts
in the aftermath of the 11 September events, but banks have raised objections, The
objections relate to new instruments which may be introduced to fight terrorism, but
then predestined to be employed for tax enforcement purposes. It seems that
objections to the erosion of bank secrecy when tax enforcement is the only policy
goals will not disappear in the near future.
2.  The OECD will have more chances of achieving results if it solves the three
problems of ‘refocusing’ its project in terms of practical policy implications,
credibility (that is, putting the tax house of member states in order by the deadline of
April 2003 before defensive measures are used against tax havens), and
compensation of tax havens. Compensation requires creativity in the choices of
policy instruments. There are two main implications for the EU direct tax policy.
First, the EU will benefit from the renewed impetus for the OECD plan. Second, if
the OECD manages to reach concrete results in its review of member states’
preferential tax regimes, this will make the code of conduct more credible and
perhaps contribute to the institutionalisation of the code. Although the OECD
review and the code have different goals and methods, there are areas in which they
overlap. So much so that some regimes covered by the OECD forum are also the
target of the code. Success at the OECD table would therefore make the code of
conduct exercise easier and more credible.
3.  In the EU, the attempt to crack down on harmful tax competition is based on a three-
pronged tax policy package. The bundling of three different proposals is still a cause
of uncertainty and problems of commitment, enforcement, and compliance but, so
far, the Commission and the Council have stuck to the concept of a package. As a
result, there are still some ambiguities on what the code can really achieve. The
Council has not as yet discussed and endorsed the Primarolo report on the 66
harmful tax measures in the member states and dependent territories. For its part, the
Commission is capitalising on the link between state aids and the code to put
pressure on member states. But member states sitting at the code of conduct table
have not resolved some issues as to what they really want to achieve with this policy
instrument. Having said that, there is evidence that the code, although its full
implementation hinges on the success of the tax package, is already having an effect
in that some member states are reforming elements of their tax system with the goal
of respecting the criteria outlined in the code. Domestic tax laws are also the target
of the European Court of Justice.
4.  These changes indicate the need for a coherent tax policy for EU corporate tax
reform. Without such a policy, there will be no sense of direction in the reforms
undertaken as a consequence of a) specific (hence not comprehensive) decisions of
the Court and b) an instrument—the code—the results of which will be consolidated
only if the full tax package is approved by the Council.
5.  The question then becomes what direction is most appropriate for EU corporate tax
policy? A fundamental goal of EU corporate tax policy should be to balancePART I BY CLAUDIO M. RADAELLI
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‘positive’ integration – that is, market-shaping tax policies and negative integration
– that is, market-creating tax policies.
62 To understand why this balance is
important, one should observe that there are two types of distortions in the single
market: for simplicity, we call them tax holes and tax obstacles to the single market.
The fight against harmful tax competition aims to tackle the issue of tax holes by
using positive integration. The idea behind the current tax package is based on
positive or market-shaping policies, that is, policies aimed at governing or directing
the market. The official rhetoric in the EU fight against harmful tax competition
stresses the need to curb unbridled harmful tax competition – a clear indication of
the intention to steer a process. However, market-shaping policies (or positive
integration) make sense only if a single market exists for tax purposes.
Conceptually, positive integration is the step following  negative integration. One
should first strike down the obstacles to the single market (negative integration), and
then try to shape or govern the undesirable aspects of the market (positive
integration).
6.  The negative integration component of tax policy, however, is still at best
embryonic. The 1990 directives (on parent-subsidiaries and mergers and
acquisitions), the 1990 convention on arbitration in transfer pricing disputes, the
action of the European Court of Justice and the proposal for a directive on interest
and royalty payments do not represent an adequate framework for an effective
action against tax obstacles. To achieve a balance in EU tax policy, obstacles should
become at least as important as tax holes. This means addressing the problems of
companies doing business in the Community.
7.  This balance between positive and negative integration can be achieved now that the
relationships between institutions and the business community are changing. Both
the OECD and the EU are more engaged in dialogue with business than in the past.
Joint initiatives, policy fora, and studies are underway. The two panels established
by the Commission on effective tax rates and the tax obstacles to the single market
are the most important examples of the acknowledgement that a balance is needed.
The Commission’s policy on tax infringements – inaugurated with the
Communication on The elimination of tax obstacles to the cross-border provision of
occupational pensions – goes in the direction of negative integration, or creating the
tax conditions for the single market.
8.  In terms of policy instruments, the Commission is seeking to enrich the menu of
instruments used to advance tax policy. In the future, we may expect fewer
directives and more flexible instruments. The use of the open coordination method,
arguably, could be extended beyond the code of conduct. Indeed, it could be one of
the options to consider in the reform of EU corporate taxation. The Commission
may also use enhanced co-operation when a critical mass of countries (but not all of
them) wishes to take a common position on tax policy. It is unlikely that enhanced
co-operation will be used in areas such as the taxation of savings, but there is scope
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for enhanced cooperation in policies aimed at attacking the tax obstacles to the
single market.
9.  Taking into account the new political climate, the Commission can balance positive
and negative integration, reduce the emphasis on top-down tax coordination
(directives, QMV), bring the single market back into the tax picture, make political
capital out of the results of the two panels, and propose the EU as a transfer platform
(that is, to suggest tax instruments that those who want can adopt).
10. Finally, there is the question: What are the implications of the political analysis
contained in this part of the report for the proposals discussed by the Task Force?.
Of course, the reader has to read the description of proposals such as Home State
Taxation (HST) and Common Base Taxation (CBT) in the second part of the report
in order to understand what the issues are. Moreover, the Executive Summary is the
place where the reader can find the opinions of the Task Force, whereas the
individual authors take responsibility for the opinions expressed in their parts of the
report. With these two caveats in mind, how can the new politics of corporate
taxation affect the proposals for reform? In terms of the options discussed in the
second part of the report, the first implication is that (HST) may have political
appeal in the near future. By contrast, it is not at all clear whether there are political
preconditions for an agreement on the optional EU base (to be employed in a regime
of Common Base Taxation). HST is based on mutual recognition as major drive for
convergence. HST does not require member states to agree on a common definition
of the tax base – hence there is no need to seek a directive on the EU tax base.
Considering the point about the limited role of directives in the future EU tax policy,
this is an advantage. But there is a second advantage. By using mutual recognition to
produce convergence, HST does not require member states to design the standards
of the tax base first. To design the 'EU tax base' at the table of finance ministers runs
the risk of setting standards that may soon become obsolete – and there is no
guarantee that politicians would be motivated by criteria of economic optimality in
their decisions. This is the reason why standard setting via mutual recognition is
considered a superior option to ex ante harmonisation.
63 HST, thirdly, is fully
compatible with the idea of the EU as transfer platform. Although it can be adopted
by all member states, the HST proposal is compatible with an enhanced co-
operation scenario in which less than fifteen member states (but at least eight) go
ahead with HST without preventing the remaining countries to join in later.
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PART II
ECONOMIC REVIEW OF FORMULARY METHODS IN EU
CORPORATE TAX REFORM
A LEXANDER K LEMM
*
his part of the report begins by describing briefly the current system of corporate
income taxation in the EU and its problems. The second section summarises
reform proposals that have influenced recent political and economic debates.
These include proposals such as home state taxation and common base taxation, which
require the use of formula apportionment. The choice of the tax base is described in
Section 3 while Section 4 deals with the choice of an appropriate formula. Section 5
further discusses reform proposals that are not based on formula apportionment and
Section 6 concludes.
1.  The current situation in the EU
Corporate income is taxed in every member state of the EU, but the tax rates levied and
the rules for determining the tax base differ substantially.
64 For example, in 1999
corporate income tax rates (including local taxes) ranged from 10% in Ireland (for
manufacturing) to around 51.6% in Germany (on retained earnings).
65 The detailed
differences in the rules for computing taxable profits are many and varied but include
differences in the basic rules of financial and tax accounting, in permitted stock
valuation methods, in depreciation methods and rates and in the deduction of provisions,
taxation of capital gains and relief for losses. Even if these differences may not in the
aggregate produce significantly different measures of profits over time, they still distort
business activity and investment within the Community, increase the corporate
compliance burden and, in the context of this report, complicate the efforts to produce a
greater degree of uniformity for the taxation of businesses within the Community.
Since the 1980s, tax rates and tax bases have converged to some extent, as most
countries have undergone base-broadening, rate-cutting tax reforms. This convergence
has occurred, however, without Community intervention in the form of measures to
harmonise corporate taxes, in contrast to the position with value-added taxes. Indeed,
European cooperation in the corporate tax field so far has been limited to the 1990
measures dealing with parent/subsidiary dividends, cross-border mergers and arbitration
in transfer pricing disputes. Other proposals, for example to harmonise corporate tax
systems on an imputation model or to provide a measure of cross-border loss relief,
either have been abandoned or have failed to make progress. More recently, the
                                                
* The author wishes to thank Steve Bond and Jack Mintz for very helpful comments. All responsibility for
errors remains the author’s.
64 The interaction between corporate and personal income taxes also differs to a great extent. This
potentially affects firms’ decisions on how much of their earnings to pay out as dividends, depending on
where their marginal shareholders are resident. Although this may be a very important issue, it is not
considered in this report, which focuses on taxation at the firm level.
65 Source: Bond et al. (2000). These typical rates include sub-federal taxes where appropriate.
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‘package’ of measures, comprising the Savings Directive, Interest and Royalties
Directive and the Code of Conduct on harmful tax competition, has made progress and
secured a measure of cooperation between member states on certain direct tax issues. In
essence, however, the integration of corporate income tax systems between EU
countries is not significantly more advanced than is the case between EU and most non-
EU OECD countries. Furthermore the treaty network between member states is not even
complete and the terms of existing treaties are not necessarily identical. There is as yet
no EU model treaty for use between member states, although member states generally
use the OECD model for their treaty negotiations.
On the other hand, the increasing integration of the single market and the adoption of a
single currency are exerting greater pressure on the relationship between member state
tax systems than is the case in their relationship with third countries. In addition, the
European Court of Justice has increasingly been called upon in recent years to
adjudicate the relationship between the member states’ tax systems and the ‘freedoms’
established by the EC Treaty, thereby requiring some degree of uniformity of approach
(albeit short of actual coordination) to cross-border direct tax issues. The European
Commission has also given notice of its intention to be more pro-active in the use of the
EC Treaty State Aid provisions in the direct tax field.
Nevertheless, the implication of the existing situation for multinational firms operating
in more than one European country remains that profits must be calculated individually
for each country in which a firm has a permanent establishment or subsidiary. A firm
that operates in two European countries therefore has to use separate accounting (SA),
just as a firm operating in two countries of which one is not a member of the single
market. To facilitate separate accounting, every transaction between related entities
within a multinational group must be recorded and charged. Furthermore, to ensure an
accurate allocation of taxable profits between related entities (and to prevent the
manipulation of profits between them for tax advantage), the tax law of member states
requires the use of arm’s length prices, i.e. prices that two unrelated parties would
charge each other.
The introduction of corporate income taxes predates the creation of the European
Community in all EU members. It would be unsurprising, therefore, if the current
system of separate accounting with arm’s-length prices were found not to be an ideal
solution for a single market Europe or in fact any group of countries whose economies
are highly integrated. The increasing integration of the European economies has indeed
led to a number of problems, which will be briefly summarised in the following section.
1.1 Problems of SA in integrated economies
Problems in calculating or monitoring transfer prices
Most of the disadvantages of SA arise from the difficulty in determining arm’s-length
prices. Frequently, arm’s-length prices cannot be determined objectively or may even
not exist at all. The former problem arises for example when the price of a good that is
available in a range of qualities needs to be estimated. In that case there will be many
different market prices for that good, and the determination of the right price dependent
upon quality could be administratively costly. Monitoring such transfer prices will also
be difficult for tax authorities. The latter problem may occur when intangibles are traded
within a company. If a subsidiary pays licence fees for a patent held by its parent, thenPART II BY ALEXANDER KLEMM
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there will be no market price available at all, unless the patent is also licensed to
unrelated firms. For multinationals these problems are likely to be very common. After
all, the economic rationale for integrating international operations into a multinational
group is that this is more cost-effective in some industries than trade between unrelated
firms. In such industries it is therefore possible that there will be no unrelated firms
trading an intermediate good, even if the good is in principle tradable.
The administrative costs incurred both by the multinationals and the tax authorities in
order to calculate and monitor transfer prices are not the only problem. More
importantly to the revenue authority in absolute tax terms, multinational firms can use
transfer pricing, the location of borrowing and other methods to shift profits to low -tax
jurisdictions and thereby decrease their overall tax liability. As an important part of
transactions in modern multinationals involve intangibles or qualitatively heterogeneous
products, the scope for such profit shifting can be large. On the other hand, firms that
are investigated for manipulating transfer prices may suffer double taxation of profits
even though their prices were calculated in good faith, if the tax authorities of one state
make an adjustment for which the other state will not agree a corresponding adjustment.
In this respect, achieving mutual agreement on transfer pricing adjustments may be
further complicated if two countries’ tax authorities use different rules to estimate
transfer prices.
So far this problem has been tackled by devising international rules for transfer pricing,
currently embodied in the OECD’s 1995 Transfer Pricing Guidelines. Two things can
be noted about these rules: First, the Guidelines do not produce a single method for
measuring arm’s-length transfer prices but embody five ‘approved’ methods of doing
so. This reflects the variety of circumstances in which it is necessary to calculate a
transfer price but the fact that so many ‘approved’ methods exist (leaving aside other
‘unapproved’ methods) illustrates how arbitrary the process is and means that there
remains scope for disagreements. Second, two of the methods (the Profit Split Method
and the Transactional Net Margin Method) involve methods or factors that are not
directly related to the good traded, but instead give an indication of where the profits
originate. These rules therefore approach a system in which profits are allocated by
formula rather than objectively determined arm’s-length prices. Such systems are
discussed in more detail below.
Restrictions on cross border consolidation
Under SA, multinational firms cannot consolidate their European profits for tax
purposes. This is especially problematic if they incur losses in some countries. If foreign
operations are organised as subsidiaries, it is almost never possible to set off losses
incurred by a subsidiary in one country against the profits of the parent or subsidiaries
based in other countries.
66 If foreign operations are organised as branches, some set-off
of losses is generally admitted between the branch and headquarters. This provides an
incentive to set up foreign operations as branches, if losses are expected. This may be
inefficient, if the optimal operational structure according to business needs would have
been different. Furthermore losses often cannot be set off completely even if operations
are organised as branches. This is especially worrying as it may often affect firms in the
                                                
66 Only Denmark and France allow a degree of relief in such circumstances.CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
33
process of expanding into other European countries. If their operations are expected to
be loss-making in the first few years, then the impossibility of obtaining full relief for
such losses effectively discourages their expansion. If this is a common problem, then
this is a barrier to the full establishment of the single market.
67
Administrative and compliance costs
Apart from the administrative and compliance costs that are due to the determination of
arm’s-length prices, there will more generally be costs due to the existence of different
tax authorities in each country. The administrative costs to the governments are
probably much higher than running a common agency. Firms will face compliance costs
having to deal with different tax systems and their rules. Such costs arise because the
multinational needs to employ tax advisers familiar with the tax laws of each country.
Further costs arise to the extent that different financial and accounting records have to
be produced to facilitate the computation of taxable profits and to ensure compliance
with the tax code.
1.2 Other issues that arise in case of tax reform
Any suggestion for tax reform should aim to address the problems that have arisen due
to the ongoing integration of the European economies. A reform however offers as well
the opportunity to re-evaluate more generally the effects of the taxation of corporate
income.
Before discussing any reform proposals for corporate income taxation, it may be useful
to consider why corporate income should be taxed in the first place. The incidence of
such a tax is always borne by individuals such as the firm’s employees, the owners of its
capital and its consumers. It should thus be possible to tax these individuals directly
rather than with a corporate income tax. The main reason for applying a corporate
income tax is that it serves as a withholding tax for the income of capital owners. This is
especially important for the otherwise untaxed income of inward investors. There are a
number of other commonly stated, but more disputed reasons for taxing corporate
income, e.g. that corporate income taxes serve as a charge for the use of public goods,
the limitation of liability or economic rents. The latter three arguments are especially
needed if double taxation of income, i.e. at the company and shareholder level, is to be
justified. Such a system of dividend taxation is called a classical system. In Europe
imputation systems are more common and double taxation occurs to a more limited
extent.
68
The main function of the CIT in Europe is thus to provide a withholding tax. The
difference between a corporate income tax and a withholding tax levied on dividends is
that retained earnings would not be taxed under the latter. Taxing corporate income is
thus unavoidable if the aim of the tax system is to tax income comprehensively. Under a
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Even in such circumstances, however, such manipulation remains open to the risk of adjustment by
revenue authorities under their transfer pricing rules.
68 Strictly speaking most EU countries do not have full imputation systems, but rather partial imputation
or other shareholder relief systems, in which only a partial allowance is made for taxes paid at the
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consumption tax on the other hand, corporate income taxation would not be necessary
anymore. The debate about whether a consumption or a comprehensive income tax is to
be preferred is unresolved and cannot be analysed in great detail in this report. Instead
the assumption is made that EU countries will continue to attempt to tax income
comprehensively, at least to some extent.
Under the assumption that countries do not want to abolish corporate income taxes,
what factors should they consider in implementing the tax?
Economists often stress the desirability of neutrality. A neutral tax is a tax that does not
affect investment decisions. Under neutral taxation, any project that has a pre-tax
present discounted values (PDV) greater than zero, i.e. that it is worthwhile to
undertake, would also have a positive post-tax PDV. An example of such a tax is a cash-
flow tax. One version of such a tax allows the immediate expensing of capital
investments, but does not allow interest payments to be deducted. Currently the
corporate income taxes adopted by member states are clearly not neutral. A marginal
project, i.e. one in which the pre-tax profit is just high enough to satisfy the providers of
capital would typically not go ahead, as such profit would be diminished by taxes. This
is because not only the economic rents of investments are taxed, but also normal profits,
i.e. the normal returns to capital. There are further complications due to the deductibility
of interest but not dividends. Given that current corporate income taxes are not neutral,
a reform that leads to another non-neutral system can still be an improvement and
should thus not be ruled out on that basis.
Even if a tax system is not completely neutral towards investment, there is still an issue
of whether it is at least neutral towards the  location  of investment. This can be
determined with the help of two concepts: Capital import neutrality (CIN) and capital
export neutrality (CEN). Under CIN, companies investing in a given country face the
same level of taxation irrespective of where they are officially resident. This would be
the case under separate accounting, provided profits are determined correctly and
taxation is purely source-based. If taxation is residence-based, then clearly companies
from different countries face different tax levels and CIN does not hold anymore. In that
case, however, there is CEN: investors originating in a given country face the same tax
levels irrespective of where they invest. Their investment decisions will thus be based
on factors other than the details of the corporate income tax system of the country in
which they invest.
In the EU currently none of the above hold, as some EU countries use source-based
taxation, while others use residence-based taxation. Furthermore, no country uses purely
source- or residence-based taxation. Instead, countries compromise on these ideal types.
Countries applying a residence-based system for instance typically do not attempt to tax
profits unless they are repatriated. Countries that exempt foreign source income usually
have special provisions for income from tax havens. For the functioning of the single
market CIN may be the more important point, as European firms should face the same
tax burden, irrespective of where their headquarters are based. Violations of CEN on the
other hand can even be efficiency enhancing if they represent different levels of public
good provision in different countries, and hence should be taken into account when
investment decisions are made.CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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A different issue is tax competition, which has recently attracted much attention both in
the EU and at the OECD level. Tax competition is not a clearly defined term, though.
Often a distinction is made between ‘harmful’ and legitimate tax competition. Harmful
tax competition refers mainly to tax havens and special tax regimes. As this is not really
a result of the corporate income taxes in Europe, and because there are already other
initiatives (such as the EU’s code of conduct group and the OECD’s on-going work)
aimed at this type of tax competition, it will not be dealt with here.
More generally tax competition refers to the possibility that, due to the mobility of
capital, there may be downward pressures on the level of taxes that can be raised from
corporate income. In the most basic models of tax competition this process leads to the
under-provision of public goods and is thus detrimental to welfare (e.g. Wilson (1986)
or Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986)). This result, however, is extremely sensitive to the
assumptions made and there are other models that show that tax competition can be
welfare improving, e.g. if governments are not assumed to be perfect welfare
maximisers (e.g. Edwards and Keen, 1996). Another possibility is that some countries
can export some of the tax burden to non-residents and therefore choose higher than
optimal tax rates (e.g. Bond and Samuelson, 1989).
Most economists would probably agree that the theoretical results so far are not very
robust. Empirically too the issue remains unresolved, although it seems clear that a
complete collapse of corporate tax revenues, a process often called ‘race to the bottom’,
has not yet occurred. Despite all ambiguities, the sensitivity of the tax system to tax
competition should be analysed under the different reform proposals. If a reform
increases the scope for tax competition then this would probably be seen as a weak
point by most economists, either because of welfare losses (e.g. due to under-provision
of public goods), or because of the fiscal externalities introduced. Economists more
concerned about Leviathan-type bureaucratic governments would however welcome
such a result.
Finally, any proposal needs to be examined as to whether they can be easily adopted by
countries wishing to participate later. This is important because of the expected further
enlargement of the EU. Furthermore, it is possible that not all countries will
immediately agree to implement a proposal, just as in the case of the introduction of the
single European currency.
2.  Recent reform proposals
This chapter briefly summarises reform proposals for EU corporate income taxation.
Whenever reference is made to the EU, it should be borne in mind that the area in which
a proposal is applied may be a sub-group of EU countries.
2.1 European corporate income tax (EUCIT)
An obvious, though drastic, reform proposal is to replace the current country specific
corporation tax systems by a single European corporate income tax. Tax revenues under
such a tax could either be collected centrally, or be distributed to the member states’
ministries of finance. In the latter case a formula would be needed to apportion the tax
across member states. The need for such a formula is a feature of most of the tax reform
proposals, though usually to allocate profits rather than taxes. A formula usually usesPART II BY ALEXANDER KLEMM
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one or more so called ‘factors’, e.g. the capital stock, so that the tax base or the taxes are
allocated according to the distribution of the factor or factors. If more than one factor is
used, the formula specifies how to weight each factor.
While this proposal has been the subject of academic debate the political and
institutional framework of the Community would be unlikely to support such a solution
in the foreseeable future. A number of countries have already stated their opposition to
any attempt to harmonise European taxes. It thus seems safe to assume that this
proposal, which requires the abandonment of existing corporate income taxes and the
production of a newly harmonised version is doomed to failure in the current political
climate. The analysis of EUCIT in this report is accordingly brief.
2.2 Common base taxation (CBT)
Common base taxation is a system in which all participating jurisdictions agree on a
common definition of the tax base and allow (or oblige) companies to calculate
consolidated profits using this common base. Such a system was recently proposed by
UNICE (2000). Its proposal was to introduce CBT as an option, so that companies can
choose whether to continue preparing up to 15 separate profit calculations under
separate accounting or calculate instead consolidated profits using the common
European definitions. How the common base would be defined is not elaborated in any
detail in the proposals.
An important difference between CBT and a EUCIT is that countries still set their own
tax rates under CBT. Only the definition of the base and a formula to apportion the tax
base to separate countries need to be agreed upon by participating jurisdictions.
69 How
the part of the base that is apportioned to any given jurisdiction is taxed, is then up to
that jurisdiction to decide, provided that this is done in a non-discriminatory way.
70
2.3 Home state taxation (HST)
Home state taxation allows firms to calculate consolidated profits according to the rules
of their home state. As under CBT these profits are allocated using formula
apportionment and taxed at each jurisdiction’s rate. The difference however is that there
will be no commonly agreed definition of the tax base. Instead jurisdictions agree to
mutually accept each other’s definition.
This proposal is based on the assumption that taxable profits would be similar across
jurisdictions, even if specific rules may differ. The idea behind this assumption is that
each jurisdiction has to make arbitrary decisions as to how to treat different components
of profit calculations. It may matter little whether one of these components is treated
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70 It is also possible, both in the case of CBT and EUCIT, to allow countries to offer tax credits. A
country that wished to encourage a certain activity could thus offer a tax credit for firms investing in this
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more favourable in another country, as long as this is outweighed by less favourable
treatment of another component.
2.4 Abolition of corporate income taxation
Corporate income taxes currently raise on average 8.7% of the total tax revenue in EU
countries. This amounts to about 3.5% of GDP.
71 Assuming that countries would want
to compensate for such a loss in tax revenues, some other taxes would need to be raised
or new taxes introduced over time. Therefore any efficiency gain will have to be
weighed against the efficiency cost of compensatory taxation. Alternatives that are often
mentioned are to move towards the more comprehensive or higher taxation of value
added or to tax inputs, such as capital directly. Alternatively, higher taxes could be
raised from other sources such as labour income, although this would be contrary to the
desire expressed by the member states to reduce the burden of taxes on labour income
and maintain taxes on capital.
3.  The definition of the tax base
The common approach of EUCIT, CBT, HST and related proposals is to allow (or
force) companies to calculate consolidated profits across the EU. These profits (taxes in
the case of EUCIT) are then apportioned using a formula to participating jurisdictions
within the EU. There are a number of issues that arise equally in all of these proposals.
This chapter will first examine those common issues and then discuss the differences
between the systems.
3.1 Common features of EUCIT, CBT and HST
Consolidation of profits
The first issue that needs to be addressed is at what level should profits be consolidated?
Should subsidiaries be treated any differently from branches?
72 A possibility is to use
the concept of ‘unitary combination’. This concept is currently used in some US states.
Exact definitions vary from state to state,
73 but the general idea is to include in a unitary
group all units of a company that form part of the same business, irrespective of whether
they hold a separate legal identity.
While the idea behind the concept is simple, it may in practice be quite difficult to
determine whether two business units form a unitary group. As one of the aims of
reform is to reduce the administrative burden, it is absolutely essential to find a
definition that can be easily understood and applied. Unfortunately most simple
definitions fail to do justice to the concept. For example, a rule stipulating that all units
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means are the same for 1998). Corporate income tax revenues as a percentage of total tax range from
4.1% in Austria to 17.4% in Luxembourg. As a fraction of GDP tax revenues range from 1.8% in
Germany to 7.3% in Luxembourg.
72 This discussion does not only apply to the EU but also to individual countries, not all of which (e.g.
Italy) currently allow for the consolidation of group profits and losses.
73 States differ also in that some only allow unitary combination while others require it. Furthermore some
states do not restrict unitary combination to US activities of a business (the ‘water’s edge’), but allow, on
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in which a company holds at least a 50% interest are included would count a subsidiary
that is not integrated into a group’s operations , but exclude business units that are under
the effective control of a company, even though it holds less than 50% of its capital.
74 In
practice therefore rules will have to be more complicated and take account both of
ownership and control.
The implementation of unitary combination in the EU may be more difficult than in the
US, as the corporate structures in some member states are comparatively complicated,
e.g. there may be cross-holdings, pyramidal groups, etc. An advantage in Europe would
be that the rules could be determined centrally, so that unlike in the US, the definitions
would be the same in each jurisdiction.
Unitary combination is not a requirement of formula apportionment. Canada for
instance does not use the concept of unitary combination and requires each subsidiary to
file independent tax calculations. Nevertheless, the case for applying unitary
combination in Europe is strong. After all, it is one of the aims of the reform proposals
to improve the opportunities to set off losses against profits. Unitary combination allows
that set-off irrespective of the legal structure of a company’s units. The legal structure
can then be determined according to the company’s business needs. Furthermore the
problems of determining transfer prices are not restricted to branches; in fact,
subsidiaries are the more common structure of European companies’ foreign European
operations.
Finally, without unitary combination, a company can in effect choose between which of
its business units it wants to consolidate accounts, by choosing to set up some of them
as branches and others as subsidiaries. Thus, loss-making activities, especially in high-
tax countries would be set up as branches, while profitable activities in low-tax
countries would be set up as subsidiaries. In that case the scope for profit-shifting would
increase as compared to the current situation, although it is already common planning to
establish as a branch initially when losses are anticipated and then convert to a
subsidiary.
All of the systems discussed in this chapter do away with separate accounting, although
some of them only on an optional basis. For those companies that participate, there will
be no need anymore to determine arm’s-length transfer prices and consolidation will be
fully available. This would also mean that intra-company dividends and royalties would
have to be tax-free, as dividends currently are within member states.
75 This latter point
could however also be achieved by measures such as the proposed interest and royalties
directive.
                                                
74 See McLure and Weiner (2000), pp. 262 ff. for further details. They also provide a summary of legal
tests of unitary combination in the US and provide further references.
75 If dividend and royalty payments within the EU are not taxed, it may be advisable to introduce a
common tax treatment of dividends and royalties between EU countries and the rest of the world.
Otherwise all income originating outside the EU would be channelled through the countries applying the
lowest tax rates. Dividends and royalties paid to non-EU residents would be paid from the country
applying the lowest withholding rates. Alternatively a group could be required to use its home state’s
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Administrative issues
The main administrative advantage for companies adopting any of these proposals is
that for tax purposes only one consolidated profit calculation needs to be made instead
of up to 15 separate ones. Only one set of rules needs to be followed rather than up to 15
different ones. The administrative implications for tax authorities are less clear. In case
of EUCIT and CBT, tax authorities would have to learn to use and monitor new rules,
which at least in the first few years would require substantial investments in training of
their staff and possibly in updating computer programmes. In contrast to companies
these costs for tax administrations cannot be weighed against the advantage of not
having to deal with 15 systems anymore. Furthermore tax authorities would have to start
accepting evidence, such as invoices, contracts, etc. in any of the European languages.
Checking foreign documentation for fraud is likely to be much more difficult and
onerous than domestic documentation, so that cooperation among tax authorities would
need to be improved. It should be noted, however, that the correct calculation of arm’s-
length prices also requires such cooperation. The administrative gains for companies are
especially high if present definitions of tax bases differ substantially across the regions
in which they operate. Unfortunately this would exactly be the case in which it would be
difficult for participating jurisdictions to agree a solution.
Separate accounting vs. CBT and HST
Given the difficulties of separate accounting it may seem surprising that it is still the
norm across the world. There are a number of reasons for that, the main one probably
being that, if arm’s-length prices can be accurately computed, separate accounting is
superior, in the sense that it reveals accurately where profits arise. No formula can ever
be more than a rough guide for the location of profits. This can be seen by thinking of a
company that operates in two jurisdictions, but at different levels of profitability.
Whatever formula is used, as long as it is based on inputs and sales, it will not reveal the
fact that the profitability is higher in one jurisdiction and that jurisdiction will thus lose
revenues compared to the separate accounting case.
This is not just a theoretical curiosity. Empirical studies (e.g. Shackelford and Slemrod,
1998, and literature cited therein) have shown that using formula apportionment
internationally (i.e. not restricted to a region, such as the EU) would lead to increases in
US tax revenues. Shackelford and Slemrod estimate increases in tax revenues of up to
38% assuming that tax rates remain constant. They point out that this could be caused
by higher profitability of non-US operations, or by successful profit shifting. In any
case, this shows the difficulties of using formula apportionment in an international
setting. If countries believe that they will lose tax revenues to foreign jurisdictions, they
will be very unlikely to accept such an agreement. As taxation is a reflection of each
country’s sovereignty, it is hard to see why elected representatives should opt for such a
system. This is particularly the case if tax revenues were affected by real differences in
profits, rather than profit-shifting. Side-payments could not easily solve this because
countries gaining revenue would probably take the view that the new system is fairer.
Furthermore, these would have to be frequently negotiated, as differences in
profitability probably do not remain constant.
Within a federal state these issues do arise, but to a far lesser extent. First, the bulk of
corporate taxes usually go to the federal government anyway. Second, the federalPART II BY ALEXANDER KLEMM
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government often helps out states that have lower tax revenues. Third, there may well
be more confidence in the appropriateness of the outcome across federal states than
across nations. A federal state might not be as concerned if 5% of its corporate tax
revenues were attributed to one of its neighbours as, say, France would be if 5% of its
revenues were apportioned to the US. In fact such a situation has already arisen when
the state of California attempted to introduce compulsory world-wide unitary
combination. These attempts were countered by legal challenges by European firms and
strong criticism by a number of European governments and the European
Commission.
76
For formula apportionment to work in the EU, a necessary premise would be that
member states trust each other to the extent of accepting any loss of tax revenues. This
may be possible if the overall gains are seen to outweigh any such losses. The extent to
which such redistribution of tax revenues can be avoided by choosing tax rates is
discussed below.
Should the new tax system be optional?
HST and CBT are both put forward on an optional basis for companies rather than as
compulsory reforms.
77 Companies which prefer to continue using separate accounting
will thus be allowed to do so. This has a number of implications for economic and
administrative efficiency.
•  Tax revenues are likely to decrease, as companies will only adopt the new system if
they expect to pay less taxes under the new system (unless their administrative gains
outweigh higher taxes).
•  The incentives for the adoption of the new system are problematic: Those firms that
gain most from profit-shifting through the manipulation of transfer prices are the
ones that are least likely to adopt the new system. This could be countered by
applying tighter rules for the determination of transfer prices for those companies
that prefer to continue using SA.
•  Administrative gains are likely to be lower if companies choose to prepare two
profit calculations in order to find out which system is more generous for them. On
the other hand, administrative costs due to changing the internal accounting system
could be avoided by companies for whom these would be extremely high (e.g.
SMEs). Revenue authorities would have to continue operating both systems.
•  Differences in the tax burden between companies would increase, if only some
companies took up the new scheme. This would result in different firms in the same
business using different tax rules, e.g. because their parent companies have different
characteristics that make adoption of CBT worthwhile only for one of them.
These disadvantages are somewhat mitigated because under both proposals firms will
have to make a binding choice as to whether they wish to adopt the new system. This
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77 For the proponents of CBT, the optional nature of the proposal is said to be fundamental to its
acceptability to the corporate sector and a necessary feature enabling member states to agree a common
base. In the case of HST, the optional nature of the system is essentially a transitional feature to enable
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choice cannot be changed year by year depending on the level of tax liability under both
methods. Still the economic case for making the new system optional seems to be very
weak. Nevertheless this may be a good interim solution in an imperfect world. As
revenue and economic effects of tax reforms are extremely difficult to predict, making
the system optional would provide an opportunity to evaluate the system and to adjust
based on experience. Once the system is working well, i.e. tax revenues are at the
desired level and cooperation between tax authorities has been established, the new
system could become compulsory for all European multinationals. As the proposals
made are based on optionality, however, this feature will be assumed for the rest of this
report.
Residence and source-based taxation
As mentioned above, some EU countries currently tax world-wide income while others
exclude foreign source income, both subject to exceptions. For income originating in
other EU countries, under EUCIT both possibilities would amount to the same. A
residence-based country will not exclude foreign EU profits, but the taxes owed will be
exactly identical to the deduction for taxes paid. Under CBT and HST, residence-based
countries could still tax the foreign source income, if tax rates abroad are below home
tax rates. The calculation of such taxes would be extremely easy, as the tax base would
simply have to be multiplied by the difference in tax rates. Nevertheless, it will be
assumed in this report that residence-based countries will not attempt to claim taxes on
EU profits anymore. It would run counter to the spirit of an agreement such as HST or
CBT, if a country taxed more than the share apportioned by the agreed formula.
The difference between source and residence-based taxation remains with respect to
foreign source income originating outside the EU. Such income would have to be
allocated to a country; either the home state of a firm, or the state in which the
subsidiary resided that receives the income. Then it would be either taxed or exempt,
depending on the rules of the country to which it is allocated. Once it has been taxed (or
exempt), the firm can retain it to finance investments or pay it out as dividends. There is
thus a strong incentive to receive such income in countries that exempt foreign source
income (unless the taxes paid abroad are higher anyway). This could thus influence the
choice of which subsidiaries receive foreign source income or the choice of the home
state (see below), depending on which rule is used (see also footnote 75).
3.2 Differences between the proposals
The main practical difference between HST and CBT is that under the former system
firms will follow their home state rules for the calculation of profits (resulting in
different rules for firms based in different home states) while under CBT, all firms that
opt for the new system face the same rules. This section examines some of the
economic, administrative and other effects of this difference.
78
                                                
78 In making these comparisons, however, it should be borne in mind that it is an assumption of the HST
proposal that member states are unable to agree immediately on the rules of a common base. The ‘choice’
between HST and CBT therefore does not exist in the ordinary sense of a choice between alternatives. If
it is correct that member states would be unable to agree immediately on common base rules, therefore,
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Choice of location
A firm operating in the EU faces a number of location choices. It needs to choose a state
as its home state, and locations for production, sales and other operations. The first of
these choices will differ depending on whether CBT or HST is introduced. The latter are
not affected by the difference between CBT and HST, although they will be affected by
the formula used to apportion tax revenues across jurisdictions, the tax rate and any
local tax credits (if allowed). EUCIT is completely neutral towards the choice of
locations, unless the concept is compromised by allowing regional tax credits, subsidies
or taxes. Under HST the home state is important because its rules are used to determine
taxable profits. Under CBT the home state is of much lesser importance because it will
affect taxation only to the extent that head office operations will lead to the
apportionment of some of the profit to the home state.
A related issue to be resolved is whether companies face free choice over which country
will be their home state or whether there should be parameters within which the
determination must be made. Free choice of home state may not seem sensible if that
allows firms to choose countries on the basis of the tax advantages they offer even if
they have only marginal operations there. On the other hand, free choice may seem
fairer to companies, as no company would be at a disadvantage just because it had
previously chosen to locate its headquarters in a particular state.
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A precondition for HST to be feasible is that tax bases do not differ significantly
amongst participating countries. Otherwise firms residing in countries with
comparatively broad definitions of taxable income (and a lower tax rate) will face a
higher tax burden when profits are allocated to other countries that adopt a narrower tax
base and higher tax rate. This will seem unfair the companies concerned (unless they
can freely change their Home State) and to their home countries. Currently, there are
quite substantial differences in the detailed definitions of taxable profits between
countries. Differences in the tax burden, however, are not always that large because
countries with broad definitions of the tax base may have lower tax rates (see footnote
82). Also over time tax bases have not been constant. Many EU countries have
undertaken base-broadening rate-cutting reforms over the last two decades. Under HST,
if countries compete for the location of headquarters, there would be incentives to take
these reforms back. A country that decides to increase its tax rate and to narrow its base
in a revenue neutral way, will become a more attractive one to locate a company’s
headquarters. This will be mitigated, however, if countries compete simultaneously for
the location of production because this will be affected by the tax rate imposed.
80 In
                                                                                                                                              
time as agreement on a common base is feasible, rather than seek to adopt HST as an incremental or
transitional measure itself.
79 One way to achieve convergence within Europe would be allow free choice. Companies can then be
expected to choose their preferred state, whose tax system will become the basis of a harmonised EU
system. This corresponds to the US experience with company law: each state has its own company law
and there is no US company law, but in practice Delaware has become the prevailing company law
system of choice. While such an approach circumvents the need to agree on a common base, there is a
risk that the rules used by the state favoured by companies would not be regarded as the best possible rule
by the majority of experts and policy-makers.
80 At the risk of speculating too much, it may be conjectured that a possible outcome would be that some
countries, e.g. very small ones, will specialise in offering competitive tax rules for the location ofCEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
43
order to avoid such competitive pressures, a certain degree of conformity in the
definition of the tax base thus seems necessary to avoid large differences in tax
liabilities for similar companies that are registered in different home states, and to
prevent inefficient competition across member states.
81 A further complication arises if
a country’s rules differ according to the industry in which a company operates. For
conglomerates there could then be incentives to identify the most generous location for
each industry and split up its operations into separate entities to benefit from the
different rules. Under unitary combination this would however only be possible if firms
formally split.
Hence, if the rules for determining taxable profits differ to the extent that substantially
different profit levels are obtained depending on the set of rules used, HST could lead to
inefficiencies and CBT would be preferable. Agreeing the rules for a common base
could be difficult in that situation though. If on the other hand different rules produce
similar overall taxable profits over time, then HST may be feasible while CBT could
still be difficult to agree upon, given the need to iron out the differences of detail that
exist between systems. This would then be the key case in which HST would be
preferable to CBT. On the other hand, if tax rules are similar, not only in their overall
results but also in their details, both HST and CBT could be feasible. As it is, the
current situation in the EU is not characterised by nearly identical rules and the overall
outcome in terms of taxable profits may also differ substantially.
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The choice of a suitable tax rate
Under both CBT and HST each country could still set its own tax rate, which in the case
of HST is assumed to correspond to that faced by companies that continue to use
separate accounting. Under CBT it may be useful to allow jurisdictions to charge a
different tax rate to companies choosing the reformed system, if the tax base defined
according to the common rules differs from the one obtained otherwise. This would
allow jurisdictions to maintain tax revenues at the same level. Under HST, however, it
seems inevitable that the tax rate be the same whatever definition is used, because
otherwise there would be too much scope for discrimination and international dispute.
                                                                                                                                              
headquarters, while others cut tax rates to attract production facilities. The total effect could be a loss in
tax revenues. The introduction of some incentives would, however, be constrained by the EC State Aid
rules and the Code of Conduct group on harmful tax competition, as well as any limitations imposed in
setting up the HST system.
81 This is not to say that competition for the location of firms’ headquarters is generally undesirable.
Competition over the legal system, the efficiency of the bureaucracy etc. may well be desirable.
Inefficient is competition in which a country manipulates the rules so that its own tax revenues are
unaffected, but those of other countries decrease.
82 This can be seen by comparing statutory tax rates and effective average tax rates, i.e. tax rates that
include the effects of allowances and tax rules. In 1999, the statutory tax rates in the three largest EU
economies were 40% in France, 51.6 % in Germany and 30% in the UK. Effective average tax rates for
these three countries differ significantly less though. For equity financed investment in plant and
machinery they are in the narrow range of 16.8% in the UK to 19.7% in Germany. For investments
financed by a weighted average of retained earnings, equity and debt, effective rates range from 23.5% in
the UK to 31.9% in Germany (Source and exact definitions: Bond and Chennells, 2000). The difference
in tax rates is thus partially compensated by differences in other tax rules. The fact that the distribution of
effective average tax rates differs depending on the assumptions about the investment and its finance also
suggests, that tax outcomes may be more similar for some types of firms than for others.PART II BY ALEXANDER KLEMM
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Companies, therefore, would face different tax liabilities depending on their country of
origin. Firms based in jurisdictions where the definition of the tax base is comparatively
narrow would then have a stronger incentive to take up HST than companies based in
countries employing a broader definition.
83
So as not to cause confusion about the aims of the reform, it is advisable to attempt to
keep the reform revenue neutral. A reform linked to tax increases could be unpopular
with businesses despite its other advantages, while a reform linked to tax cuts might be
unacceptable to governments or create the impression that the reform was caused by
pressure of multinationals. Under HST this would not be possible, but under CBT
revenue neutrality can, at least in theory be achieved by choosing an appropriate tax
rate. In practice, however, it may be difficult to calculate a tax rate that would lead to
the same level of taxation as before the reform, especially if it is unknown how many
and which companies will take up CBT. Companies probably take the effective level of
taxes into account; the general public, however, will be mainly interested in the level of
the statutory tax rate. If for any reason the same tax rate will be charged irrespective of
which base is used, then this will lead to a higher or lower level of taxes for firms opting
for CBT. Obviously, if taxes are higher under CBT, very few firms would choose to
take it up.
Once the system is established, quite complicated incentive effects can occur if
countries can adjust the tax rate on corporate profits simultaneously with other taxes.
Some countries might depend more on tax revenues from labour taxation than others
and therefore charge a low corporate tax rate. Such a country would be an attractive one
to locate production in. If capital is mobile and labour immobile, then such a country
may face incentives to cut corporation taxes even further. While this will lead to lower
corporation tax revenues (assuming that the revenue elasticity of corporate taxes is less
than one), an influx of capital will lead to higher wages or less unemployment. This in
turn will increase revenues from labour taxes. If labour is not completely immobile,
then this will not necessarily hold, as the incidence of labour taxes will not be purely on
labour anymore.
Capital export neutrality (CEN)
Under the current system CEN does not hold, either within the EU or between the EU
and third countries. The reason for that is that no European country employs a perfect
residence based system of taxation. As countries would still be allowed to set their own
tax rates under both HST and CBT, CEN would not be achieved by the reform either.
Whether the tax system would approach CEN or diverge from it depends on the
assumptions made.
First it is assumed that the formula used to apportion profits is chosen so as to correctly
reflect profits in each region, or equivalently that profitability is the same in each
region. Under HST each company calculates its taxable profits under its home country’s
definition. If it invests abroad, it will face the foreign country’s tax rate on part of its
profits. If those countries that charge high tax rates use narrow definitions of the tax
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base and vice versa, then HST will lead to a less neutral system,
84 because a firm
investing in a high tax country will no longer have the benefit of the narrow base. From
the point of view of the firm, levels of tax in the EU will have become more diverse. If
on the other hand countries are either generous on both accounts, i.e. have both narrow
tax bases and low tax rates, or strict on both accounts, then HST will improve CEN. For
a given firm EU tax levels will appear to have become more similar. In practice, there
are examples of both possibilities within the EU. The effect of HST on CEN thus
remains ambiguous.
Under CBT, if countries choose the tax rate in a revenue neutral way, CEN will not
change on average. The differences in tax levels between countries will just become
more easily observable, as they will be completely reflected in the differences in tax
rates charged.
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Dropping the assumption of perfect apportionment of profits changes the results
dramatically. In that case it becomes difficult to model accurately the effect of an
investment in another EU country. An example easily illustrates the case. Let us assume
that a firm’s foreign investment makes exactly zero profits (i.e. negative economic
rents). As long as capital is one of the factors used to apportion profits, some of the
profit will be apportioned to the country into which the firm is exporting capital. If the
tax rate is lower in that country, tax payments will fall as a consequence of the
investment; if it is higher, tax payments will increase. In such a case CEN is so much
distorted that investments in low tax countries can even be worthwhile if they do not
lead to profits. On the other hand investments in high tax countries may be discouraged
if there is uncertainty or if profits are expected only after some initial period.
It is not just the extreme case of zero profits that this affects. More generally, whenever
the expected profits (or losses) of an investment are smaller than the changes in tax
liabilities, capital export decisions can be severely distorted. These arguments hold in
the case of both CBT and HST. For an equivalent thing to happen under separate
accounting, a firm would have to invest in a country charging a tax rate of above 100%
or paying out tax credits. This does not imply, however, that separate accounting is
closer to CEN. As losses of a foreign operation cannot be consolidated under SA,
capital exports are even discouraged between countries levying tax at the same rate.
The conclusion of this discussion of CEN, therefore, is that the results are theoretically
ambiguous. This issue can only be resolved empirically, although probably only with
great difficulty.
Capital import neutrality (CIN)
While CEN can never be achieved as long as countries tax companies at different rates,
CIN is achievable even without complete co-ordination. It already holds for capital
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imports originating from countries that apply source-based taxation.
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On the same basis as the discussion of CEN, it will first be assumed that capital imports
do not lead to changes in tax liability that are in excess of any profits or losses. In that
case CBT will lead to CIN (assuming, as mentioned above, that even countries using a
residence-based system will not tax profits in other EU countries). This would be an
improvement for capital imports from countries that use a residence-based system.
Under HST, however, CIN will not hold. Even though all firms investing in one country
face the same tax rate, because their tax bases differ, their tax liabilities will differ as
well.
Dropping the assumption from the previous paragraph again changes the simple results.
CBT then no longer guarantees CIN. A country can thus attract zero-profit investments
from countries that charge higher tax rates, while it will discourage such investments
from countries charging lower tax rates. The same argument applies to HST.
Again there is ambiguity instead of clear conclusion. As long as one is willing to make
the assumption that investments affect profits more strongly then tax revenue, we can
conclude that CBT is preferable to HST and to SA in terms of CIN.
3.3  The territorial scope of formula apportionment
Two questions arise about the territorial scope of the reform: first, which countries will
participate in the mutual recognition of their definitions of profits or agree on a common
definition. Second, what is the area in which consolidation of profits is allowed.
As regards participation in the proposals, it is implicitly assumed that the whole EU
would agree on the introduction of HST or CBT. As in the case of the Euro, however, it
may be necessary to start with a smaller group, if not all countries wish to participate
immediately, while others do not want to be held back. As in the case of the Euro,
countries may be required to fulfil certain preconditions before being allowed to take
part. For example, as currency fluctuations are a problem because they can strongly
affect the factors used in a formula, EMU membership may be a sensible precondition
for participation in the formula apportionment system.
It is possible, therefore, that only the eurozone countries would first agree to adopt
formula apportionment. The initial group should not be too small though, first because it
may be politically undesirable if the EU splits up in too many groups of countries
converging at different speeds and second, because countries will find it more difficult
to join later if they have not participated in negotiating the formula. Concerning the
economic effects, the larger the initial group the better because otherwise there will be
too many jurisdictions left in which companies will continue to be obliged to use
separate accounting.
So far the implicit assumption was made that formula apportionment would only be
used to cover those countries that have agreed on its use. It is possible, however, to
apply the system to consolidated world-wide profits, even if only a handful of European
                                                
86 Although no country in the EU uses a system that perfectly corresponds to source-based taxation, most
deviations from that ideal type concern tax haven and are thus of a lesser importance for intra-EU
investments.CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
47
countries have agreed on a formula and on whether to use CBT or HST. A European
firm would then need to calculate world-wide consolidated profits and determine its tax
liabilities to participating European governments using the formula. Tax liabilities to
third countries would continue to be determined according to the rules of those
countries, i.e. using separate accounting. International companies operating in Europe
would need to choose one of the European states as their home state and then go
through the same process as European companies.
A major disadvantage of such a solution would be that companies can be under- or
overtaxed, if profits are split differently depending on whether formula apportionment
or separate accounting is used. A firm, for example, that makes most of its profits in the
USA but has higher sales in the EU, would have attributed much of its profits to the EU
by the European authorities (if sales is one of the factors in the formula), while the US
authorities would attribute most of the profits to the USA using separate accounting.
This would lead to double-taxation of some of the profits of such a firm. It is equally
easy to think of firms where the opposite would happen.
There have already been empirical attempts to estimate the total effect such a step
would have for the US. Shackelford and Slemrod (1998) for instance estimate the US
tax liabilities of multinationals would increase by about 38% if the US adopted world-
wide unitary combination and a three-factor formula. Much of this increase is due to oil
and gas firms. They explain these results by either higher profitability abroad, tax
motivated income shifting or measurement error. They also summarise previous
findings in the literature. Although the results differ, all share the common feature of
estimating higher US tax liabilities than under separate accounting.
There appear to be no equivalent studies estimating the revenue effects for the EU, but
given that the EU is also a net oil-importer, the results could be similar. However, even
if the aggregate effects are close to zero, the distortions for individual companies
affected by double- or under-taxation can be enormous. It seems advisable, therefore, to
restrict the use of unitary combination and formula apportionment to the EU and to
continue to use separate accounting to divide income between the EU and third
countries. In the literature this is often referred to as restricting the use of formula
apportionment to the ‘water’s edge’. In the case of the EU this term seems less intuitive
and has therefore generally been avoided in this report.
It is sometimes argued that the adoption of formula apportionment will increase
complexities for companies operating both within and outside of the EU, as they will
have to use two systems: formula apportionment and separate accounting. In fact, the
use of formula apportionment within the EU would not add any administrative
difficulties to transactions with third countries, it would just fail to do away with
transfer prices in that case. The total amount of transfer prices a multinational would
have to determine would still decrease as a result of such a reform. This can also be
compared with the current situation of US multinationals that use FA within the US, but
SA for non-US operations. It would be difficult to argue that FA in the US is not
efficient simply because it cannot be used on a world-wide basis.PART II BY ALEXANDER KLEMM
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4.  The choice of formula
Provided European countries can agree on any of the definitions of the tax base
discussed above, the equally important issue of the choice of an appropriate formula
needs to be tackled. This choice is extremely important as it will simultaneously affect
each country’s tax revenue and incentives faced by companies. In the case of EUCIT, it
is tax revenues rather than profits that are apportioned. With tax revenues it is possible
to construct a formula based on macro-economic factors, such as GDP. On the other
hand, under HST and CBT it is micro-economic factors, such as a firm’s inputs and
outputs, that are likely to be used to apportion profits. Unlike macro-economic factors,
micro-economic factors can be directly influenced by a firm. This chapter will discuss
the incentives faced by firms and jurisdictions arising from the use of such micro-
economic factors.
Prior to determining a formula the issue of which countries are entitled to receive tax
revenues should be resolved. Clearly countries in which none of the components of the
formula are based would not be entitled to any revenue. In the USA and Canada the
conditions are however more restrictive. In Canada, only Provinces in which a company
has a permanent establishment  are entitled to tax revenue. In the US the definition is
less clear-cut, but similar in effect: A company is said to have ‘nexus’ with states in
which it operates unless the business undertaken is only minimal business related to
sales. States in which a company has sales, but no establishment would thus not be
entitled to a share of tax revenues, even if sales formed part of the agreed formula. This
seems a reasonable condition, especially as the location of sales is sometimes difficult to
determine, e.g. if sales occur over the internet. Both the US and Canada have special
provisions to deal with industries where these definitions would be difficult to apply,
e.g. the transport industry. An advantage of adopting the Canadian approach is that rules
to determine whether a company has a permanent establishment are already in place
(but would have to include subsidiaries if unitary combination were allowed).
A starting point of the analysis of formula apportionment can be those economies that
have already gained experience in using formulae. Among others, these include the
USA and Canada. The most common components used in apportionment formulae are
sales, labour and capital. In Canada all Provinces use a formula giving equal weight to
sales and payroll. In the USA an equal weighted formula of all three factors used to be
the norm, but now most States give higher weights to the sales factor. This has led to the
suspicion that if there is competition for mobile capital, there will always be an
incentive to increase the weight of the sales factor. Anand and Sansing (2000) however
show that this is not true if some factors are immobile. In their model countries
importing natural resources do face such incentives (though through a slightly different
mechanism), but exporters of natural resources face the opposite incentive, i.e. to
increase the weight on production-linked factors.
Anand and Sansing also show, that social welfare is maximised when states co-ordinate
their choice of apportionment formula. One of the advantages of using a common
apportionment formula is that over or under-taxation of businesses is avoided.
87 Once
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co-ordination has taken place, however, each state faces an incentive to deviate from the
strategy. The authors therefore conclude that a system of formula apportionment in the
international context is bound to be fragile. In the context of the European Union this
argument may be rather weak, however, as once a treaty is made individual countries
would not be able deviate from it even if there are such incentives. This is especially
true as long as fiscal reforms need to be approved unanimously. In that case, however, it
may be difficult to agree on a formula in the first place.
On the premise that the aim of formula apportionment is to allocate profits to the
jurisdictions where they occur, what factors should be used? There is certainly no
reason to restrict the discussion to factors that are being used in other countries. The
most accurate possibility would be to use profits. This would give exactly the same
result as SA and would also cause the same problems. An alternative would be to use
valued added. The definition of value added at the firm level is output less intermediate
goods and raw materials. It therefore consists of profits, interest payments and wages
and salaries. The main disadvantage of using value added is that its calculation requires
knowledge of the prices of intermediate goods. In case of multinational companies they
will often come from abroad, and therefore transfer prices will again have to be
calculated. Manipulation of transfer prices will however be less attractive to firms (and
less harmful to governments), as value added comprises apart from profits also interest
payments and wages and salaries. The percentage of value added that can be shifted by
using manipulated transfer prices is thus considerably smaller than the percentage of
profits that could be shifted.
Factors based on inputs
Another possibility is to use inputs, such as capital and labour. Profits are generally
thought of as returns to capital. Therefore using capital seems an obvious candidate to
be used as a factor to allocate profits. There are, however, a number of reasons why no
formula is based on this single factor. First, capital is more difficult to measure
accurately than payroll or sales. Most firms use historical cost accounting, usually
without re-valuing assets either to compensate for inflation or to reflect changes in
replacement costs. Furthermore, depreciation charges are usually arbitrary rather than
reflecting true economic depreciation. In an environment of inflation, recently acquired
assets would thus have higher weight than older ones. If revaluation is possible, there is
an incentive to re-value assets in low tax countries, but not in high tax countries if asset
prices are rising. The opposite holds if asset prices are falling.
Another problem of using capital is that some industries, e.g. the service industries,
mainly use intangible capital whose valuation could well prove more problematic than
the estimation of transfer prices. To deal with these issues, other inputs such as labour
can be used. The determination of the payroll factor is comparatively easy, although
some questions need to be resolved, e.g. whether to include social security
contributions.
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The effect of using payroll as well as capital, is that no longer the location of profits is
approximated , but instead the location of value added. The use of a second factor in the
formula also creates the problem of having to weight the two factors. These weights
should approximately reflect the percentage of value added due to capital and labour. In
practice this may be difficult to determine. Furthermore the capital-labour ratios vary
widely across industries (see below).
Outputs as a factor
Apart from inputs, most countries also use outputs as a factor to apportion profits. In
fact, the sales factor is often the factor with the highest weighting. If the aim of formula
apportionment is to replicate the distribution of profits under SA, without the need to
calculate transfer prices, then the justification for using this factor is rather weak. Under
SA, a jurisdiction in which only sales take place would receive very little tax revenues,
only the tax on the profits made through distributing a product within a state (provided
transfer prices are not manipulated). This should be replicated by the labour and
property used in that state.
If sales are also used then the justification must therefore be a different one. One
explanation would be that having established that within an integrated multinational it is
impossible to exactly allocate profits to where they originate. After all this causes the
described problems with transfer prices. If it is accepted that an exact allocation of
profits is not possible, then it may not seem unreasonable to use a factor that is easy to
measure and difficult to manipulate such a sales. Furthermore, philosophically it is
impossible to say whether profits accrue according to where something is produced or
where it is sold.
Other explanations for the use of a sales factor are the incentives that states face when
choosing a formula. A state in which a company has high sales, but no or very little
production, may want to claim part of the profits made by such firms. If aggregate sales
in a state are high compared to production, then a state may not be willing to agree to
the use of formula apportionment unless sales are included in the formula.
In US debates on formula apportionment it is often argued that States face a strong
incentive to increase the weight on the sales factor. This makes the State more attractive
for the location of businesses because the importance of taxes on inputs diminishes. The
higher weight on sales, however, does not influence locational choices because firms
would have to deal with this irrespective of where they produce. Goolsbee and Maydew
(2000) have examined this issue empirically. They found that indeed States that attach
higher weight to the sales factor have higher levels of manufacturing employment. This
has negative externalities on neighbouring States. The aggregate effects of changes of
apportionment formulae are however close to zero. As mentioned above, however,
Anand and Sansing (2000) have shown that the incentives to increase the sales factor
are not the same for all states, as it depends on whether they are importers or exporters
of manufactured goods.
The usual procedure dealing with exports out of the area in which formula
apportionment is used is to allocate such sales to the state/country in which the sale
originates. This is often referred to as a ‘throwback’ rule. An alternative would be to
exclude such sales completely. This seems more sensible, if it is believed that sales are a
good proxy for the allocation of profits. In that case part of the profits are related toCEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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third countries and should not affect the allocation of profits within the zone in which
FA is used. If sales are just used as a practical measure, then it is less clear whether or
not a throwback rule should be used.
Incentives faced by firms and jurisdictions
Tax reform is a complicated process, and trying to reform every tax at the same time
would be an attempt doomed to failure. It is problematic, however, to deal with a single
tax, such as corporate income tax, without taking into account its interactions with other
taxes. McLure (1981) showed that using formula apportionment based on particular
factors effectively creates taxes on these factors. These taxes however are not equivalent
to taxes directly levied on these factors. A sales tax, for instance, is different from a tax
on profits allocated using sales as a factor, because a sales tax needs to be paid
irrespective of whether the operation is profitable. In that sense a corporate income tax
is more neutral as it is discourages less strongly investment that may lead to low profits.
On the other hand, a sales tax is more neutral concerning investment that is meant to
raise productivity because a formula that includes a sales factor would increase
corporate profits for a given level of sales and would lead to higher corporate income
taxes. A sales tax would not have such an effect.
There may be direct interactions with other taxes paid by companies. This may lead to
complicated incentive effects for taxing jurisdictions. Mostly this arises if taxes are
allowed to be expensed against corporate taxes. A state increasing such an expensable
tax, e.g. a payroll tax, would increase its tax revenues from that tax, while the losses in
corporate income tax revenues could partly be exported. It would be possible to deal
with this by determining rules, either restricting the opportunity to impose further
business taxes or by disallowing certain taxes to be expensable.
Tax incidence
The tax incidence of the current corporate income tax remains unresolved despite much
research. Of interest for this report is not on what factors the corporate income tax falls
but which country’s residents would bear it. McLure (1981) argues that, ‘a tax levied on
the basis of separate accounting could probably not be shifted to non-resident
consumers’. Would this change if formula apportionment were used? McLure concludes
that this is unlikely. ‘A state tax corporate income tax based on formula apportionment
is likely to be borne in large part by residents of the taxing state’. His line of reasoning
is that apportioned corporate income taxes are equivalent to taxes directly levied on
factors. The incidence then falls on those factors that are immobile rather than those that
are mobile.
Economic rents
As long as profits are proportional to the inputs used to apportion profits, the result will
closely replicate the results achieved under separate accounting with arm’s length prices
(provided such prices are determined correctly). It is most likely, however, that the
assumption of profits that are proportional to inputs is violated. After all, profitability
varies greatly across countries, industries and individual firms. This is mainly due to
economic rents that may, for example, accrue as a result of a patent. Under formula
apportionment these rents are allocated across all jurisdictions, irrespective of whether
they are due to a certain location or not. This may be a problem for certain location-
specific rents. In the case of a patent this may not matter that much because it is likelyPART II BY ALEXANDER KLEMM
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to be difficult to allocate it to a particular country unless it had been financed, developed
and used in one and the same country. In the case of multinationals working in many
member states, it is likely that most parts will have contributed to the total amount of
rents earned by the company. Allocation of the rent according to payroll may therefore
be better than alternative approximations. In the case of location specific rents, other
taxes may be used to extract most of such rents where they originate (see however
section on interaction between taxes).
Administrative issues
Administratively, the factors of sales and payroll should not pose too many problems.
The only difficulty with the payroll factor is that it needs to be clearly defined, as a
priori it is not clear whether this includes non-wage costs, such as social security (and
private insurance) contributions. In the case of sales it may occasionally be difficult to
determine the location. An internet transaction, for example, could be thought of as
taking place at the location of the distributor, of the purchaser or of the server. It should
be possible though to devise rules to deal with such situations. In order to cover
unforeseen cases, there could be a rule to split sales across jurisdictions that justifiably
make a claim on such sales.
Administratively, the most cumbersome of the classical three factors is the capital stock.
There is no generally agreed measure for capital stock, and accountants and economists
often take very different views on how capital should be measured. Common
accounting practice is to use historical cost and more or less arbitrary methods of
depreciation. The failure to allow for asset inflation can, however, lead to large
discrepancies across firms, depending on when they purchased their assets. Other
concepts, such as replacement cost, are extremely difficult to implement as most of a
firm’s capital stock is generally not traded in any given year.
More serious administrative complications may arise if different formulae are applied to
different industries. Even if on average a standard formula using the common three
factors capital, payroll and sales were found to be appropriate, this would not hold for
all industries. In some industries one or more of the factors may not be very meaningful
indicators of where profits originate. Even if no attempt is made allocate profits to
where they originate, an inappropriate formula could still lead to problems by causing
incentives to use manipulate the allocation of factors. An example would be a firm in
the service sector (i.e. with little measured capital) with two equally profitable
operations, one of which is established in a more valuable building. Because such a firm
has very little measured capital, such a difference could strongly affect the allocation of
profits. There may even be an incentive to invest in idle capital in a low tax country. If
this is found to be common problem rather than just a theoretical possibility, then a
balance must be found between defining accurate industry specific formulae and crude
approximation based on very broad industry definitions. Nothing would be gained if
resources freed from determining arm’s length prices are instead used to determine
which industry’s formula is to be applied.CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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5.  Other proposals
Recommendations of the Ruding Committee
The 1992 Ruding Committee report did not consider either CBT or HST as such. It did,
however, recommend the harmonisation of tax bases and made a number of concrete
recommendations for progress towards that end. It also recommended harmonisation of
tax rates, at least within a range of 30% to 40%. In that respect the recommendations of
the Ruding committee require more harmonisation than the options discussed here, as
both the CBT and HST proposals envisage that the choice of the tax rate would remain
the prerogative of each country.
Otherwise, the Ruding report carefully stresses the principle of subsidiarity and
therefore does not recommend general alignment of tax systems but instead focuses on
issues that pose problems to the functioning of the single market, e.g. double taxation of
dividends. The Ruding Committee envisaged that these problems should be tackled by
directives, e.g. the extension of the parent/subsidiary directive to all enterprises subject
to corporate income taxes. The fact that not all or even the least controversial
recommendations have been implemented suggests that the pace of reform will not be
quick. On the other hand, due to monetary union that now exists between most states,
some reform proposals that seemed unattractive at the time of the report may well be
feasible now.
EUCIT
As this would do away with separate accounting in the EU, there would be no problem
of determining or monitoring transfer prices within the EU. Furthermore any losses
could be set off against profits, just as in the case of two domestic operations. If EUCIT
is similar in structure to currently used tax systems it would not be neutral for
investment decisions. At least for European companies, however, it would lead to both
CEN (into EU countries) and CIN, i.e. it would be neutral for investment locations.
The disadvantage of a European corporate income tax would be that such a tax would
restrict each country’s possibilities to use tax policy to pursue its national economic
aims. An example would be the case of Ireland, which would no longer be able to attract
capital by offering a low tax rate. Without that possibility, it may be extremely difficult
for less advanced or peripheral countries to compete with the most industrialised central
countries.
88 This could be mitigated by allowing countries the use of tax credits (e.g.
linked to investment), but at the price of re-introducing complexities into an otherwise
simple tax system.
Whatever its attractiveness, this proposition does not seem feasible in the near future.
The reasons include the difficulty to agree on a set of rules, as results of theoretically
optimal tax systems are very vague. Most of the reasons are however political in nature,
such as the need to decide fiscal policy unanimously. Instead of a short-term policy
goal, EUCIT may be better though of as a possible long-term solution to European
corporate taxation.
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6.  Conclusion
This part of the report has summarised the main short comings of using separate
accounting within the ever more integrating European economies. The wide range of
complications that arise from this concern both economic and administrative efficiency.
A number of reform proposals have been discussed. Based on the assumption that
corporate taxes will not be abolished in the near future, and that corporate profits (or an
approximation thereof) will continue to form the tax base, the three main proposals are
HST, CBT and EUCIT.
While EUCIT may seem the obvious solution, it is the least likely to be implemented or
even seriously considered due to political and institutional factors, such as the desire by
most countries to be able to determine tax rates according to their economic policy.
HST and CBT would solve the problems associated with separate accounting while
leaving the control over tax rates to individual countries. Whether or not they should be
implemented depends on wide range of factors. HST can only be efficient if rules for
the determination of taxable profits produce similar results.  In that case HST provides a
way forward for European tax reform without the need to agree on every detail of a set
of often arbitrary rules.  If tax rules lead to substantially different outcomes in terms of
measuring taxable profits over time, then only CBT is an efficient option. The problem
is that in the face of such diversity it would be especially difficult to agree on a common
definition of the base.
The conclusion is that whatever path is chosen to reach an integrated European system
of corporate income taxation, the premise is to create a uniform set of tax rules (not tax
levels). This could be done by seeking to harmonise specific rules, a procedure which
could eventually lead to CBT. If such harmonisation proves too difficult to implement,
there is still the option to co-ordinate rules so that they produce similar results. This
would allow the introduction of HST, which in turn may facilitate the later adoption of
CBT. In any case neither HST nor CBT is likely to be the final outcome of the
integration process. Instead, either proposal may prove to be a transitional arrangement
for a European Union that is in the yet incomplete process of integration.55
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APPENDIX
C OMMENT FROM NICLAS VIRIN, M EMBER OF THE TASK FORCE
Many suggestions have been launched, the most elaborate and creative one being the
Home State Tax Model (HST). The others are more or less variations on a common base
model discussed over and over again.
The merits of a common system would be that the problem of transfer pricing and
offsetting of losses would be solved. This would be important indeed, but there are a
number of other problems to be solved, mainly associated with the fact that the business
tax rules need to be extremely complicated to match different needs and political aims
and still more complicated because the economic reality is so complex. That makes the
business tax system a risk of the rule of law, because no one could master the whole
regulatory system. It is not possible to recognise a number of important legal concepts
in real life. The courts cannot treat similar cases alike. Business decisions are delayed
because tax considerations have to be made at great cost or even distorted because of
their tax effects.
There appears to be a common belief that business taxation is indispensable. Not only to
avoid economic discrimination between business income and salary income, but also
because a part of the economic float would evade taxation otherwise.
That is wrong! Business income (profit) and household income (salary and dividends)
are not comparable. Profit is the creation and accumulation of new resources (capital),
whereas household income is the measure of an individual’s contribution to the
common production and base for individual consumption and abstention from
consumption (taxation) in favour of common consumption and providing for individuals
in need.
And the taxation of businesses is not at all necessary to prevent tax base erosion. The
tax base profit, when kept within the boundaries of the company shell, can only be used
for the production of services and commodities. The undistributed profit represents
investment and capital growth, which can serve as the stepping stone for increasing the
welfare of mankind in the future. The rise in capital value (accumulation of profits) will
facilitate the future payment of salaries, which will be taxed in due time. The profit will
(or should) be taxed when distributed and received by the shareholders or used for
salary payments. In this way, the whole of the only enduring and genuine tax base – the
result of people’s labour – will be taxed anyway. The disappearance of company tax
revenue will be partly compensated for by rising revenues from taxes on salary income
and distributed profit. Today's overall tax burden of company profit taxes will then be
carried by individuals in a direct form. It is currently paid indirectly by reduced salaries
and/or prices raised to compensate the enterprises for their tax payments. No one carries
the tax burden of the companies but the individuals. Taxing businesses only means pre-
taxation and double taxation. In fact, the abolition of business taxation would solve the
problem of double taxation of profits.
Taxation of businesses is (relatively) efficient only in primitive economic societies
where it is not possible to tax private individuals. In a modern economy, individuals are
susceptible to taxation. The tax base is very easy to assess and everyone can see what he
receives in public services in return. It is also very easy to collect directly from the
employers. The taxing of business profits, on the other hand, is very complicated,CEPS TASK FORCE REPORT ON  EU CORPORATE TAX REFORM
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harmful to economic development (tax on capital formation) and unnecessary for the
prevention of tax base leakage. It gives very little tax revenue: only some 3-6 % of total
revenue from taxes in developed countries.
Thus, in my opinion, the best solution to the problems we are discussing is the abolition
of business taxation altogether or at least encourage the present tax competition towards
reduced company tax rates. Anyway that ought to be the opinion of the business society.
It is encouraging to hear that the US Treasury Secretary, Paul O'Neill, according to an
article in The Financial Times, 19-20 May 2001, has said that ‘he absolutely wants to
eliminate corporate income tax’ and finds ‘one of the most important moves to be the
abolition of taxation on companies’.
To give a more thorough presentation of my opinion, I refer the reader to my article
published in the Tax Planning International Review (Vol. 26, No. 6, 1999) issued by the
Bureau of National Affairs. What I say in the article still represents my opinion. What
could be added is that Estonia has abolished the taxation of undistributed profits, which
has proved to be very stimulating with respect to business activities. As a country held
back in its economic activities during the Soviet regime, it has every reason in the world
not to impede economic growth. So why punish the accumulation of capital by taxing
it?60
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